[Ha'aretz] Zvi Bar'el - The report of the Palestinian commission to investigate the capture of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007 makes fascinating reading. It paints a terrifying picture of military and political helplessness, internal disputes, family loyalties, a lack of talent and ability to administer military and political forces, and a huge waste of money (Mohammed Dahlan received $25 million to build a trained military force, which collapsed in one moment). Its most significant revelation is that Mahmoud Abbas knew Hamas was about to take control of Gaza and did not manage to prevent it. This raises questions about the assumption that Israel can depend on the Fatah leadership and on Abbas personally to be able to control the situation. The report provides a harsh response to the dilemma of whether to strengthen Abbas. It suggests that the diplomatic horizon or its absence and the Israeli attitude toward the PA had little effect on the strengthening or weakening of Abbas vis-a-vis Hamas. The internal disputes, the power struggles over jobs and money, the weakness of the central government, the subversion of commanders against their leadership, intergenerational conflicts, and family loyalties all overshadowed the ability of any political initiative to turn Abbas into a leader who determines policy and is capable of implementing it.
2008-03-07 01:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive