[Wall Street Journal Europe] Bruno Schirra - The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate made the improbable case that Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. This assessment not only contradicted previous U.S. intelligence consensus but - as recent court documents show - also the conclusions of Germany, a key U.S. ally with excellent sources in Iran. The BND, Germany's foreign intelligence agency, has amassed evidence of a sophisticated Iranian nuclear weapons program that continued beyond 2003. Earlier this year, in a case about possible illegal trading with Iran, a special national security panel of the Federal Supreme Court in Karlsruhe cited from a May 2008 BND report, saying the agency "showed comprehensively" that "development work on nuclear weapons can be observed in Iran even after 2003." The BND further noted "the development of a new missile launcher and the similarities between Iran's acquisition efforts and those of countries with already known nuclear weapons programs, such as Pakistan and North Korea." The judges stated unequivocally that "Iran in 2007 worked on the development of nuclear weapons." The court's decision and the BND's reports raise the question of how, or why, U.S. intelligence officials could have come to the conclusion that Iran suspended its program in 2003. German intelligence officials wonder themselves. BND sources told me that they shared their findings and documentation with their U.S. colleagues ahead of the 2007 NIE report. It appears the Americans simply ignored this evidence, suggesting not so much a failure of U.S. intelligence but its sabotage. The politicized 2007 NIE report undermined the Bush Administration's efforts to rally international support for tough action against Iran.
2009-07-24 06:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive