The Egyptian-Israeli Peace: Lessons for Today

[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] Kenneth Stein - When the Carter administration took office in 1977, it sought but failed to convene an international conference with all concerned parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, which refused to recognize Israel's existence. And without consulting Israel, Egypt, or the U.S. Congress, the Carter administration decided to invite the Soviet Union to play an influential role in resumed Arab-Israeli negotiations. The initial approach of the Carter administration failed. In addition, the administration failed to realize that Sadat and Begin were already negotiating directly through their emissaries. An impatient Carter administration often aligned itself with Sadat, who wanted quick action; it viewed Israel's slowness in the negotiating process as a stalling tactic. But unlike Egypt, where Sadat could essentially make unilateral decisions, Israel requires collective cabinet approval. The new U.S. administration can play a constructive role if misunderstandings like these can be avoided. The writer, author of Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (1999), teaches Middle Eastern history and political science at Emory University.


2009-03-26 06:00:00

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