[Wall Street Journal] John Bolton - The most widely touted outcome of last week's Geneva talks with Iran was the "agreement in principle" to send approximately one nuclear-weapon's worth of Iran's low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for enrichment to 19.75% and fabrication into fuel rods for Tehran's research reactor. As a result, any momentum toward stricter sanctions has been dissipated, and Iran's fraudulent, repressive regime again hobnobs with the UN Security Council's permanent members. Consider the following problems: Diplomacy's three slipperiest words are "agreement in principle." An Iranian official said the Geneva deal "is just based on principles. We have not agreed on any amount or any numbers." Bargaining over the deal's specifics could stretch out indefinitely. The "agreement" also undercuts Security Council resolutions forbidding Iranian uranium enrichment. Moreover, considering Iran's utter lack of credibility, we have no idea whether its declared LEU constitutes anything near its entire stockpile. Raising Iran's LEU to higher enrichment levels is a step backwards. Two-thirds of the work to get 90% enriched uranium, the most efficient weapons grade, is accomplished when U235 isotope levels in natural uranium are enriched to Iran's current level of approximately 3%-5%. Further enrichment of Iran's LEU to 19.75% is a significant step in the wrong direction. This is barely under the 20% definition of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU). The 19.75% enriched uranium could be reconverted into uranium hexafluoride gas and quickly enriched to 90%. The writer is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
2009-10-05 06:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive