(Politico) Laura Rozen - Columbia University professor Gary Sick, a veteran National Security Council Iran hand, was the leader of the Iranian team in the Harvard simulation. His account: The U.S. team went to work with a vengeance to get a consensus on sanctions. This didn't bother the Iran team in the least. We didn't think they could put together a package that would hurt us in any serious way, and that proved to be true. But more important, in the process they managed to offend all of their ostensible allies and wasted so much time and effort that Iran was better off at the end than they had been at the beginning. Since this represents a version of actual U.S. strategy over three administrations, I think there is a lesson there that is ignored at our peril. As far as I could tell, the pursuit of sanctions was essentially an end in itself. But does it stop Iran? To be honest, the Iran team scarcely paid any attention to all this massive policy exertion. We never felt that our core objectives (freedom to proceed with our nuclear plans and our growing appetite for domestic political repression) were at risk, much less the survival of our regime. We largely ignored the ineffective pressure tactics originating from the U.S. Why was there no push to test Iran on safeguards, inspections, or other techniques that might assure the world of reliable and on-going intelligence about what Iran is doing (early warning); or restricting certain key elements of Iran's nuclear program that would lengthen the time required to actually break out into production of a nuclear device? Nobody tried. This game provided an opportunity for me to test my understanding of the dynamics propelling each side in the Iran debate. And the result, I am sorry to say, was even more depressing than I would have imagined. The lesson was not so much that Iran could "win" this game so easily; it was that the U.S. and its allies were unable even to imagine any alternatives.
2009-12-07 10:22:14Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive