(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Michael Herzog - When inviting the parties to direct negotiations, Washington abstained from issuing terms of reference. The Palestinian Authority demanded that the baseline for talks be the 1967 lines with agreed swaps, which Israel rejected as an unwarranted precondition that would establish a single-issue endgame (i.e., on territory) before negotiations even began. This seemingly technical issue is likely to become a substantive one. The PA has prioritized the territorial endgame as a prerequisite for compromise on other core issues. But security is the first priority for the Israeli government, which will not yield major territorial concessions until it is sure that the resultant Palestinian state would be effectively demilitarized and non-threatening. To bypass such an impasse, past negotiations were based on the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." This proved to be an obstacle when the parties failed to bridge gaps on all core issues: "all or nothing" resulted in nothing and prevented incremental steps forward. It is time to adopt a less rigid formula that allows for progress even if the parties cannot reach a comprehensive agreement. In statesmanship it is always advisable to contemplate a Plan B in case Plan A is derailed. Currently, only the PA seems to be doing so via its West Bank state-building process, coupled with fostering the idea of seeking UN recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines. While the state-building process should be encouraged by all, the U.S. would do well, at this stage, to dispel Palestinian hopes of adding a unilateral diplomatic layer to the negotiations. The writer, a retired brigadier general, is the Washington Institute's Milton Fine International Fellow, based in Israel.
2010-09-14 07:25:30Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive