(Strategic Assessment-Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Giora Eiland - Four main lessons can be learned from the IDF's conduct during the Second Intifada: The first is the need for flexibility. The IDF was required to make fast adjustments from a situation in which the main challenge was civil demonstrations, to a situation in which the chief threat was terrorism. The chief of staff from 2002-2005, Moshe Ya'alon, was in the habit of holding a brainstorming session every two weeks which greatly helped to identify changes over the course of that period. The second lesson underscores the importance of intelligence. In fact, the intelligence was excellent. It was based on an established infrastructure of human intelligence and on a real improvement in eavesdropping technologies (SIGINT) and visual intelligence (VISINT), especially from unmanned aerial vehicles. Brigade commanders on the ground were exposed to sensitive intelligence material, and the results were not long in coming. Third is control of the territory. When weighing how to act against terrorism that is well entrenched in a built-up area, if there is good intelligence, then there are many operational advantages to operating in the area. If the intelligence is not good, then the presence of forces in the built-up area only makes easy targets for the terrorist elements. The fourth lesson concerns the relationship with the political echelon. In this type of fighting, every large military action has diplomatic significance, and every diplomatic action has a direct influence on the military's room to maneuver and its freedom of action. When the generals order an action, they must pay attention to the diplomatic significance as well. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland is a senior research associate at INSS.
2010-11-18 08:08:25Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive