(Wall Street Journal) Mark Bowden - Why has it proved so hard to reconstitute the Iraqi army if, as the elections suggested, the insurgency lacks broad-based popular support? According to Maj. James Lechner, who commanded a unit responsible for training and then leading the 7th Battalion of the new Iraqi army in Samarra last October, the main problem was not with Iraqi soldiers. It was with their officers and their loyalty to the way Saddam ran his army. Maj. Lechner noticed that the Iraqi commanders in his battalion tended to equate rank more with privilege than with responsibility. They were reluctant to stay on duty with their units for any length of time without "special passes or extended leaves," and the higher up the chain of command, the worse the problem. Just prior to going into action in Samarra, the Iraqi battalion commander took a leave and didn't return until the city was secured. Up and down the officer ranks Maj. Lechner found a marked propensity to steal from their units, falsify records, embezzle funds, and even extort money from their own men. It has become generally accepted wisdom that it was a mistake to disband Saddam's army. If Maj. Lechner's experience is typical, then retaining the old force would have just created a whole different set of problems, and might well have further set back efforts to create a flexible, effective Iraqi army. Solving the problem in the 7th Battalion ultimately required rooting out nearly all of those officers who had served under the old regime.
2005-02-10 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive