(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Maj. Gen. Doron Almog - In late 2000, after most of the Gaza security fence was demolished by the Palestinians, the IDF Southern Command learned the lessons behind the barrier's operational failure. A variety of important new security features were added when Israel reconstructed the Gaza fence in 2001 as part of a multicomponent defensive "seam zone," such as enhanced interception capabilities, improved high-tech sensors, overlapping observation posts, and a continuous monitoring and videotaping system. In order to replicate the Gaza fence in the West Bank, all the essential elements of the Gaza defensive model must be implemented as a package, without any exceptions. Although most of these components have been implemented in the West Bank, two key elements have been omitted: bulldozed security buffer zones and special rules of engagement for those military personnel responsible for monitoring the fence and its environs. Terrorists have been quick to exploit these omissions, and Israeli civilians have consequently paid a heavy price. In order to protect its citizens - including those in large West Bank settlements - Israel must assert control over the vital buffer areas needed to maximize the effectiveness of the fence, and the IDF must implement rules of engagement that give soldiers in the field increased authority to make timely decisions.
2004-04-23 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive