(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Patrick Clawson - Some Iranian leaders seem to believe they could advance four of their main goals through armed conflict with the U.S.: namely, resisting "global arrogance," creating disorder in the oil markets, justifying nuclear breakout, and rallying the nation. The Iranian navy still regards its 1988 confrontation with the U.S. - sparked by the mining of a U.S. warship - as a great victory that it studies closely, despite the sinking of several Iranian vessels. If Iran got lucky and sank a U.S. warship during an actual conflict, television viewers around the world might conclude that the U.S. Navy had lost the war no matter what happened next. When the U.S. got its nose bloodied by the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing and the 1993 Somali "Black Hawk down" incident, Washington withdrew its forces from both countries. Iran may hope for the same result via confrontation in the Gulf. The best prospect for persuading Khamenei to revert to his past cautiousness is to clearly lay out that the U.S. has red lines which, if crossed, will cost Iran dearly. The writer is director of research and head of the Iran Security Initiative at The Washington Institute.
2012-01-20 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive