(New York Times) Ronen Bergman - In January 2007, Israeli intelligence officials were horrified by information acquired when Mossad agents broke into the hotel room of a senior Syrian official in London and downloaded the contents of his laptop. The pilfered files revealed that Syria, aided by North Korea, was building a nuclear reactor that could produce an atomic bomb. Until then, according to military intelligence officials, Israeli intelligence thought Syria had no nuclear program. The discovery caused a panic in Israel, and grave concern in Washington, which had relied heavily on Israel's assurances that it knew everything about Syria. By the time the reactor was discovered, it was almost ready to become operational. The lesson in humility that intelligence agencies should have learned from this affair is evident. I was therefore surprised by the assertions of American and Israeli officials I interviewed who repeatedly stated, "we will know," when we talked about the possibility of Iran's moving to produce nuclear weapons. In Jerusalem and Washington, officials assume that as soon as information is received that Iran has moved to build nuclear weapons, Israel will decide to attack its nuclear facilities. The momentous decision will be driven to an extraordinary extent by intelligence reports. But even though intense focus on Iran's nuclear program has presumably increased the volume of intelligence gathered about it, it remains true that intelligence officers tend to rely heavily on a few trusted sources. And it may be only human for a case officer to be excited by discovering something that appears to be a secret. Bits of data can be misread, however, and erroneous analysis has a habit of finding its way to those most eager to use it. So in watching Iran's nuclear project, even a slight intelligence gaffe could have an outcome of historic proportions. The writer is a senior political and military analyst for Yediot Ahronot.
2012-04-12 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive