(Dayan Center/Jaffee Center - Tel Aviv University ) Yehudit Ronen- In early 2003, rebels from among the non-Arab Darfurians demanded that the Arab-Muslim elite in Khartoum, which has governed Sudan since independence in 1956, halt the unceasing raids of the nomadic Arab Baqqara militias - the Janjaweed - on the non-Arab Darfurian farmers. The Sudanese army, worn out by decades of fighting against rebels in the south, delegated to the Baqqara militias the mission of crushing the rebels. The U.S. administration is preoccupied with Iraq and engaged in a hotly contested election campaign. This reduces Washington's margin of independent maneuver and limits it to internationally-coordinated measures, such as the recent UN resolution for which the U.S. could secure approval only by agreeing to remove any reference to sanctions. The EU's capacity to act is constrained by its member states, some of which (especially France) have major political and economic interests in Sudan, particularly in Sudanese oil. Other foreign oil firms - including Talisman of Canada, the China National Petroleum Corporation, and the Qatari Gulf Petroleum Company - are also deeply involved in Sudan's oil industry and would be adversely affected by the imposition of sanctions on Sudan. While Egypt and Libya, as neighboring states, could give real force to any possible international sanctions regime, any erosion of Sudanese leader 'Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir's political standing might pave the way for the revival of Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi's Islamist influence. The conflicting interests and circumstances of members of the so-called "international community" make the practical implementation of sanctions rather improbable. The writer is a research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, specializing in the history and politics of Sudan, Libya, and North Africa.
2004-08-16 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive