[New Republic/Washington Institute for Near East Policy] Dennis Ross - Iran's seizure of 15 British sailors for nearly two weeks was an event that offered us a window to watch the balance of forces in the Iranian leadership. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was responsible for the seizure. Did the IRGC have the clout among the Iranian elite to determine how Iran's leaders would deal with the crisis? If it could be overruled after triggering a crisis, we would learn a great deal about its real political weight and discover whether the major decision-makers are governed more by pragmatism than rigid ideology. The non-IRGC segments are mindful of the costs of isolation, and they don't seek nuclear arms at any price. That is the meaning of pragmatism - recognizing Iran's interests and not pursuing a path that ultimately costs Iran more than it gains. Our challenge on the nuclear issue is to develop a strategy that convinces the Iranians their interests will be harmed more than helped by acquiring nuclear arms. The Iranian press did not even mention the crisis for several days after the British sailors were seized: This was hardly a case in which the regime was trying to whip the public into a frenzy. After the release of the sailors, Ahmadinejad was roundly criticized in many Iranian newspapers, which noted that the crisis cost Iran greatly without any corresponding benefit. Admadinejad himself acknowledged that the British made no concessions when he said that they weren't big enough to admit mistake. What does this tell us about the Iranian nukes? - that the issue of Iran's nuclear future is not resolved. It is not ultimately in Ahmadinejad's hands or the hands of the IRGC. It may not be easy to stop or suspend the program, but it's not impossible.
2007-04-25 01:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive