Yes to an Agreement that Distances Iran from the Bomb

(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Amos Yadlin - Does the Iranian charm campaign signal a willingness to forfeit a military nuclear capability, or is it yet another attempt to attain this option at the lowest possible cost? The U.S. and Israel must concentrate on the parameters that widen the distance between Iran and the bomb should Iran unilaterally abrogate the agreement. This would entail a strict limit on the number of centrifuges spinning in Iran, enrichment limited to 3.5%, removal of all enriched material from Iran, and return of enriched material to Iran only in a form that cannot be used in nuclear bombs. An agreement that freezes Iran's program at its current extent - with material that if enriched to a military level will be enough for 7 to 9 bombs - is a bad agreement and is unacceptable. A freeze at this level and a functional Fordo enrichment facility are an excellent foundation for a bomb at any time Iran decides to withdraw from the agreement. There are risks inherent in the negotiations process itself: it is essential that the process have a predetermined final date. Iran is liable to resort once again to delay tactics to buy time to advance its nuclear project. Despite all the moderation on display, the Iranians have not conceded a thing. IDF Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, former head of Military Intelligence, is director of INSS.


2013-09-30 00:00:00

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