(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv) Ephraim Asculai and Emily B. Landau - U.S. negotiator Wendy Sherman has said the key element in ensuring that the Iranian nuclear program is and remains completely peaceful is "verification." The U.S. insists it will be able to detect and deal in a timely manner with an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons and that it will be in total control of any ominous development in the Iranian nuclear project. Placing so much weight on successful verification is a dangerous proposition. The true key to a successful deal with Iran is not verification; it is, rather, clear indication that Iran has opted to abandon its military nuclear ambitions. Moreover, verification is not guaranteed to stop Iran in time. The history of intelligence in general, and of verification in particular, is replete with instances of failure. For decades, Iran has been working on a military nuclear program while cheating on its NPT commitment. Clarifying what is known as the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program must be an integral part of any comprehensive deal. Iran did not declare concealed facilities until it was forced to admit their existence, and Iran has been consistent in not revealing any details of its military-related nuclear project, even after evidence to this effect was disclosed by the IAEA in a report in 2011. There can be no doubt that this kind of behavior will continue even if a permanent agreement is signed.
2014-03-27 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive