(New York Times) Robert Einhorn - To deter Iran's leaders from making the decision to break out of an agreement and produce nuclear weapons, any deal should meet three requirements. First, it should have rigorous monitoring measures to convince Iran that any attempt to violate and break out of the agreement at either declared or covert sites would be detected very quickly. This would require intrusive verification provisions that go beyond the measures contained in the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional protocol, including frequent access to centrifuge production facilities, detailed reporting of nuclear-related procurement and robust inspection procedures. Second, the accord should ensure that the time Iranians would need to produce one bomb's-worth of weapons-grade uranium would be long enough to enable the U.S. to intervene decisively to stop them. The Obama administration is seeking to increase this "breakout time" from the current two-to-three months to at least one year. Getting to one year would depend on a package of interrelated constraints, including on the number and type of operating centrifuges and the amount of enriched uranium Iran would be allowed to retain. Third, it is necessary to convince Iran's leaders not only that breakout would be detected promptly, but also that they would face a harsh international response that would prevent their breakout from succeeding. To supplement any agreement, the Obama administration should collaborate with its international partners and the Congress on contingency plans - including both economic and military options - to ensure that the threat of a decisive response to a breakout attempt is credible. The writer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, served on the U.S. delegation to the Iran nuclear negotiations from 2009 to 2013.
2015-02-27 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive