(Politico) Dennis Ross - No agreement that permits the Iranians after fifteen years to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) and build as large a nuclear infrastructure as they want should leave us feeling comfortable. That vulnerability could be addressed if our focus became one of deterring the Iranians from cheating. President Obama emphasizes that the agreement is based on verification, not trust. But our catching Iran cheating is less important than the price they know they will pay if we catch them. Deterrence needs to apply not just for the life of the deal. It becomes even more important afterwards, because Iran will be a threshold nuclear state and potentially capable of confronting the world with a nuclear weapons fait accompli. The Iranians must believe that a move toward weapons once they are a threshold state will trigger the use of force against them - anything less is unlikely to deter them. It is not enough to say all options are on the table. It is essential to say we will not permit Iran to become a nuclear weapon state and that if the agreement designed to prevent it fails to do so, we will act militarily to destroy the Iranian nuclear infrastructure. President Obama should declare that he would regard producing highly enriched uranium as a trigger for the use of force and is confident that his successors will as well. Congress could then adopt legislation endorsing this position. The writer is a former special assistant to President Obama and National Security Council senior director.
2015-07-31 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive