W. Bruce Weinrod (Washington Times) - President Obama has argued that his approach to Iran is essentially the same as that which Ronald Reagan took toward the Soviet Union. Obama cited Reagan's "recognition that if you were able to verify an agreement, that you would negotiate with the evil empire that was hell-bent on our destruction and was a far greater existential threat to us than Iran will ever be." Leaving aside the fact that the verification provisions in the proposed agreement are flawed, and that a nuclear-armed Iran could be at least as serious a threat as was the Soviet Union, the reality is that Obama's approach to dealing with an adversary is fundamentally different from that of Reagan. Obama believed that he could reach a satisfactory agreement by proactive engagement with a militant and aggressive Iran without preconditions or any meaningful changes in its international or domestic policies. Reagan believed that, given Moscow's avowed hostility to the West and expansionist actions, the Soviet Union must change first before he would negotiate seriously. He was not willing to risk the security of the U.S. and its allies on an agreement with an old-style communist leadership with a militant ideology and a record of cheating on arms agreements. Reagan engaged with Moscow only after Moscow began focusing on mounting domestic concerns and in effect abandoned its goal of world domination. Throughout the negotiations, Obama conceded on a variety of issues that were proclaimed to be non-negotiable by the Iranians. Reagan, however, refused to concede on key issues, and was willing to walk away from the negotiating table as he did when he refused at Reykjavik to agree to limitations on U.S. strategic defense programs. Obama has avoided remarks about repressive domestic policies that might offend Iran's leaders. In stark contrast, Reagan at his very first press conference asserted that the Soviets "reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat." Reagan strengthened America internationally and devised a strategy that ended the long-standing Soviet threat to the U.S. The proposed nuclear agreement would enhance Iran's economic and military capabilities, reinforce its militant leaders' position domestically, and result in increased Iranian regional influence. The writer is a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy (1989-1993) and the defense adviser to the U.S. mission at NATO (2007 to 2009).
2015-08-03 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive