(Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies-Bar-Ilan University) Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror - It is clear that the agreement with Iran was signed in order to delay the Iranian nuclear bomb program, not to end it. Thus, when the program rears its head again, it will be a problem several times more serious and far harder to deal with. There is no cause for hysteria. The agreement will not bring about Israel's downfall, and in the best-case scenario may even buy Israel some time to better prepare for confronting the Iranian challenge. It is a bad agreement. The reality facing Israel (and the world) following its signing is significantly more threatening than before. Iran gets to keep its (military) nuclear program, while sanctions against Iran are lifted. At some stage the U.S. decided to move from a policy aimed at dismantling Iran's nuclear capability, to a policy aimed at delaying Iran's ability to achieve nuclear weapons. As soon as the U.S. decided to make do with delaying Iran's getting the bomb, then Israel was left on the outside - not because of strained relations between the president and the prime minister, but because of significant differences of opinion. The fact that the powers signed an agreement must not be allowed to paralyze Israel. The country's security is at stake. As the current president of the U.S. has said: "Israel must be able to defend itself, by itself." Governments do not like to be put in the position of having to make difficult decisions. In 1995 Israel presented a great deal of high-quality, well-analyzed intelligence information to the U.S., to show our friends in Washington that the Iranian administration had begun a military nuclear program. The Americans appointed a team headed by a senior official to examine it. At the end, this official let us know that we had "failed completely in our efforts to create a new enemy." A further two years passed before my successor was able to persuade the Americans that the Iranian enemy was real and that its nuclear military program was dangerous. It is not difficult to imagine U.S. intelligence staff presenting information about Iranian violations and being rebuffed by decision-makers, using learned explanations, until it is simply too late. If the Iranians make an effort to cheat and to hide the evidence, it is almost certain that they will be able to develop their first nuclear device before the West can respond. There is little chance that America will follow through on its promise that, after signing the agreement, it will be more determined in its efforts to contain Iran. Once a rival state becomes a partner to an agreement, one does not increase efforts taken against it in other realms. No one in the West will now be interested in jeopardizing either the agreement or trade relations with Iran. It is therefore likely that Iran will become much stronger internally, regionally, economically, and militarily, with little opposition from the U.S. This agreement will likely and necessarily lead to the use of force against Iran, at some stage or other, in order to halt its race toward nuclear weapons. This, however, will take place in far worse conditions than before the agreement, against a far stronger Iran. The writer served as National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister, head of the National Security Council, and head of the research division of IDF Intelligence.
2015-08-07 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive