(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv) Ephraim Asculai - There is ongoing Iranian R&D on seven advanced types of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment machines, capable of much more efficient enrichment than the present, almost obsolete, IR-1 model. This means that if Iran abides by the JCPOA nuclear agreement to the letter, by the eighth year, if not before, Iran can have perfected one or more centrifuge models capable of enrichment efficiency ten times that of the present model. By year fifteen, Iran is officially permitted to do all it wants, including significant amounts of enrichment to military levels, with a breakout time measured in weeks. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be based only on trust. Iran has in the past disregarded its obligations under the NPT; it has also disregarded Security Council demands concerning R&D, including testing, of its missile program. Had there been trust in Iran's abiding by its international commitments, there would have been no need for the verification mechanism embedded in the JCPOA. But this verification system cannot search for undeclared sites and it has no power to inspect Iran's R&D work on delivery systems. There is a high probability that after ten years, Iran will proceed with the production of highly enriched uranium, and thus will have the capability to produce nuclear weapons almost at will. There should be little doubt that unless something dramatic changes in the Iranian regime or its policies, it will seek this nuclear capability. Dr. Ephraim Asculai, founder of Israel's Negev Nuclear Research Center, worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission for over 40 years and at the IAEA in Vienna.
2016-09-13 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive