(1945) Jason Killmeyer - The Iran nuclear deal was only ever limited to slowing a nuclear weapons breakout. Since 2018, it has simply not been that big a factor in Iran's relations, even if the deal consumed much of the talking time of diplomats. The U.S. seeks to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon but is unwilling to undergo the cost and risk of the military confrontation required to prevent it. The maximum pressure approach pursued by the Trump administration in conjunction with Israel wasn't sufficient either. It was useful in raising the cost to Iran's nuclear weapons pursuit, but not in preventing the end-state. Sabotage will not be sufficient to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. These actions produce setbacks, but they do not deter. Iran's dogged pursuit in spite of these very high costs makes clear the singular and ultimate aim of the regime: to join the club of nuclear-armed nations. The success of North Korea's nuclear program in forestalling the threat of regime change creates a precedent. It makes it clear to Iran that the rational path forward is to pursue - and demonstrate - a nuclear weapons capability. The only credible deterrent to that occurring is Israel. The hard power calculation underlying the Middle Eastern order is the conflict between Iran and its regional proxies and the Israeli military and intelligence services. As the U.S. explores - with Israel - the options for constraining Iran from getting nuclear weapons, it needs to move beyond the concept of raising the cost to the regime of their pursuit. Iran has already priced in that pushback and considers it acceptable.
2021-10-21 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive