(Foreign Policy) Raphael S. Cohen - Since the Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, a parade of U.S. defense officials have offered advice - largely unsolicited - about how Israel should conduct its offensive in Gaza, based on the lessons the U.S. learned from its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are many reasons why Israel has so far chosen to ignore these recommendations. For starters, Iraq and Afghanistan were much larger and half a world away; Gaza is far smaller, more compact, and right next door to Israel. Then there is the fact that the U.S. lost the Afghanistan War and produced a muddled outcome in Iraq. Yet there is another important factor at play. The Israel Defense Forces' relationship with society, cultural predilections, and norms of behavior are unique. Fewer than 1% of Americans serve on active duty and all do so by choice. The IDF is at its core a draft military, designed to be what Israel's founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, called a "people's army," both a reflection of society and the glue that binds the people together. On Oct. 7, the IDF failed not only to protect the Israeli public but it failed to protect its own: At least 274 Israeli soldiers, plus dozens of local security officials, were killed that day. Current and recently retired IDF officers often told me of the need to "restore the trust" in the IDF, and these concerns color how the officers are approaching the war in Gaza. For the military and its leaders charged with executing this war, the fight is deeply personal. Israel views its war as an existential, society-wide struggle. With rockets still falling on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; active fighting in Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, and beyond; and surging global anti-Israel sentiment, the IDF sees itself fighting on all fronts. The writer is director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation's Project Air Force.
2024-01-15 00:00:00Full ArticleBACK Visit the Daily Alert Archive