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- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
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- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
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- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
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Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
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- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
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- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
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- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
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[Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University] Col. (res.) Gabriel Siboni - Now, more than two years after the Second Lebanon War, Israel faces two major challenges. The first is how to prevent being dragged into an ongoing dynamic of attrition on the northern border similar to what developed along the border with Gaza. The second is determining the IDF's response to a large-scale conflict both in the north and in Gaza. These two challenges can be overcome by adopting the principle of a disproportionate strike against the enemy's weak points as a primary war effort, and operations to disable the enemy's missile launching capabilities as a secondary war effort. With an outbreak of hostilities, the IDF will need to act immediately, decisively, and with force that is disproportionate to the enemy's actions and the threat it poses. Punishment must be aimed at decision-makers and the power elite. In Syria, punishment should clearly be aimed at the Syrian military, the Syrian regime, and the Syrian state structure. In Lebanon, attacks should both aim at Hizbullah's military capabilities and target economic interests and the centers of civilian power. The closer the relationship between Hizbullah and the Lebanese government, the more the elements of the Lebanese state infrastructure should be targeted. Such a response will create a lasting memory among Syrian and Lebanese decision-makers, thereby increasing Israeli deterrence and reducing the likelihood of hostilities against Israel for an extended period. The writer is a Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. 2008-10-03 01:00:00Full Article
Disproportionate Force: Israel's Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War
[Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University] Col. (res.) Gabriel Siboni - Now, more than two years after the Second Lebanon War, Israel faces two major challenges. The first is how to prevent being dragged into an ongoing dynamic of attrition on the northern border similar to what developed along the border with Gaza. The second is determining the IDF's response to a large-scale conflict both in the north and in Gaza. These two challenges can be overcome by adopting the principle of a disproportionate strike against the enemy's weak points as a primary war effort, and operations to disable the enemy's missile launching capabilities as a secondary war effort. With an outbreak of hostilities, the IDF will need to act immediately, decisively, and with force that is disproportionate to the enemy's actions and the threat it poses. Punishment must be aimed at decision-makers and the power elite. In Syria, punishment should clearly be aimed at the Syrian military, the Syrian regime, and the Syrian state structure. In Lebanon, attacks should both aim at Hizbullah's military capabilities and target economic interests and the centers of civilian power. The closer the relationship between Hizbullah and the Lebanese government, the more the elements of the Lebanese state infrastructure should be targeted. Such a response will create a lasting memory among Syrian and Lebanese decision-makers, thereby increasing Israeli deterrence and reducing the likelihood of hostilities against Israel for an extended period. The writer is a Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. 2008-10-03 01:00:00Full Article
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