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- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
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- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
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[Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University] Emily B. Landau - The U.S. officials who briefed lawmakers on Syria's covert nuclear reactor believed that the reactor was intended to produce nuclear weapons. It was clearly not for producing electricity, and it was ill-suited to be a research reactor. Moreover, Syria had acted suspiciously, rushing to destroy the remains of the reactor after the attack. Determined proliferators are well aware that states are looking for smoking guns, and they put tremendous efforts into hiding their activities. Connecting the dots of weapons-related nuclear activity should be carried out in the realm of strategic analysis, where hard evidence of so-called smoking guns is but one important component. Something is amiss when intelligence officials have to bend over backwards to explain an estimate that doesn't concur with what they believe to be the actual nature of a state's nuclear activity based on their overall analysis and powers of deduction. 2008-05-05 01:00:00Full Article
Assessing Nuclear Activity in Syria and Iran
[Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University] Emily B. Landau - The U.S. officials who briefed lawmakers on Syria's covert nuclear reactor believed that the reactor was intended to produce nuclear weapons. It was clearly not for producing electricity, and it was ill-suited to be a research reactor. Moreover, Syria had acted suspiciously, rushing to destroy the remains of the reactor after the attack. Determined proliferators are well aware that states are looking for smoking guns, and they put tremendous efforts into hiding their activities. Connecting the dots of weapons-related nuclear activity should be carried out in the realm of strategic analysis, where hard evidence of so-called smoking guns is but one important component. Something is amiss when intelligence officials have to bend over backwards to explain an estimate that doesn't concur with what they believe to be the actual nature of a state's nuclear activity based on their overall analysis and powers of deduction. 2008-05-05 01:00:00Full Article
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