Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] David Makovsky - The Obama administration hopes that its efforts will promote peace talks, but so far, the president's approach has had the reverse effect. The U.S. has raised Arab expectations of a settlement freeze to a level that may be impossible to meet. In fact, PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas declared that he will not negotiate with Israel without a full settlement freeze. Saudi Arabia's refusal to cooperate with Mitchell's peace gestures also creates speculation about whether other Arab states will keep their promises. The settlement impasse has also impacted the dynamic of the Obama-Netanyahu relationship. Netanyahu is known to have felt blindsided by Obama when, without advance warning, he raised the idea of a settlement freeze during their first meeting. The Obama administration has stated that it wants Israel to stop not only outward expansion - which could be seen as territorially encroaching on a future Palestinian state - but also construction within preexisting settlements, vertical or otherwise. So far, the Obama administration has not forwarded a public rationale for this stance, but privately, U.S. officials say that brokering a total freeze would be much easier than the difficult project of monitoring the expansion of each settlement. Netanyahu opposes the freeze idea as being impractical, since school classrooms, synagogues, and other similar buildings need to be built within existing settlements. He worries that the suggested moratorium lacks an exit strategy, which would leave Israel as the scapegoat if the moratorium unravels. Israelis see the prime minister's position on vertical growth within settlements as reasonable and Obama's statements as rigid. Israel asserts that it reached a verbal understanding with the U.S. in spring 2003, enabling Israel to accept the Quartet-endorsed Roadmap peace plan, support the creation of a Palestinian state, and ultimately even withdraw from Gaza. According to the Israelis, a delegation of U.S. officials, led by then deputy national security advisor Steve Hadley, flew to Israel on May 1, 2003, to meet with Ariel Sharon to hammer out settlement principles. The two sides agreed that Israel could build within settlements so long as it constructed no new ones, engaged in no more land expropriations, and provided no financial incentives to settlers to move to the West Bank. Whatever happened in 2003, Israel's perception of the episode will cause it to question the validity of any future verbal agreement with the U.S. It seems unlikely that the U.S. and Israel will reach a sustainable freeze on settlements, other than as a short-term symbolic gesture. Nonetheless, a more sustainable no-expansion agreement is attainable, one that deals with the central issue of territorial enlargement. A nonexpansion approach might have ended the current impasse months ago, and genuine peace negotiations could already be in process. 2009-08-10 06:00:00Full Article
No Expansion vs. Freeze: Obama's Dilemma over Israeli Settlements
[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] David Makovsky - The Obama administration hopes that its efforts will promote peace talks, but so far, the president's approach has had the reverse effect. The U.S. has raised Arab expectations of a settlement freeze to a level that may be impossible to meet. In fact, PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas declared that he will not negotiate with Israel without a full settlement freeze. Saudi Arabia's refusal to cooperate with Mitchell's peace gestures also creates speculation about whether other Arab states will keep their promises. The settlement impasse has also impacted the dynamic of the Obama-Netanyahu relationship. Netanyahu is known to have felt blindsided by Obama when, without advance warning, he raised the idea of a settlement freeze during their first meeting. The Obama administration has stated that it wants Israel to stop not only outward expansion - which could be seen as territorially encroaching on a future Palestinian state - but also construction within preexisting settlements, vertical or otherwise. So far, the Obama administration has not forwarded a public rationale for this stance, but privately, U.S. officials say that brokering a total freeze would be much easier than the difficult project of monitoring the expansion of each settlement. Netanyahu opposes the freeze idea as being impractical, since school classrooms, synagogues, and other similar buildings need to be built within existing settlements. He worries that the suggested moratorium lacks an exit strategy, which would leave Israel as the scapegoat if the moratorium unravels. Israelis see the prime minister's position on vertical growth within settlements as reasonable and Obama's statements as rigid. Israel asserts that it reached a verbal understanding with the U.S. in spring 2003, enabling Israel to accept the Quartet-endorsed Roadmap peace plan, support the creation of a Palestinian state, and ultimately even withdraw from Gaza. According to the Israelis, a delegation of U.S. officials, led by then deputy national security advisor Steve Hadley, flew to Israel on May 1, 2003, to meet with Ariel Sharon to hammer out settlement principles. The two sides agreed that Israel could build within settlements so long as it constructed no new ones, engaged in no more land expropriations, and provided no financial incentives to settlers to move to the West Bank. Whatever happened in 2003, Israel's perception of the episode will cause it to question the validity of any future verbal agreement with the U.S. It seems unlikely that the U.S. and Israel will reach a sustainable freeze on settlements, other than as a short-term symbolic gesture. Nonetheless, a more sustainable no-expansion agreement is attainable, one that deals with the central issue of territorial enlargement. A nonexpansion approach might have ended the current impasse months ago, and genuine peace negotiations could already be in process. 2009-08-10 06:00:00Full Article
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