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Understanding How Iran Negotiates


[bitterlemons-international.org] Emily Landau - Too many times over the past seven years we've seen Iran agree, then disagree, then agree a little bit, then reject again, then say more time is needed to consider, then finally present a counter-proposal, then say it wants cooperation, then say it will never give up on its rights. Since 2002, Iran has at times actually cooperated for a while on the aspects of its program where it felt it could afford some flexibility, but the Iranians never took cooperation so far that it diverted them from their overall goal in the nuclear realm. And as much as the domestic situation in Iran has changed since the June elections this year, the strategy for dealing with the international community on the nuclear issue has not. Accepting that Iran is determined to achieve either a military capability or the stage where it is some six months from doing so is by now clear from IAEA documents. There is no longer any point in wasting diplomatic time by devising "clever" tests of Iran's intentions. Iran's intentions are not peaceful, and this must be adopted as the working assumption when facing it in negotiations. Iran knows that it has an advantage over the international community because not all states confronting it are interested to the same degree in stopping it. Many wish to maintain economic and other ties with Iran; these give Iran a diplomatic edge and the ability to play the divide-and-rule game. Iran's bouts of cooperation are unfortunately not an indication that Iran wants to change its ways or build confidence. Rather, for Iran, cooperation has been a necessary "evil" to ward off the harshest measures as well as gain time to advance its program. Iran falls back on cooperation when it has no other choice, and especially when some aspect of its secret military nuclear activities is blatantly exposed. Iran knows that when armed with a military nuclear capability it will be much better positioned to get a better deal from the international community. So Iran's rational interest is to put off any real negotiation until it has reached military (or assumed military) capability. Dr. Emily B. Landau is senior research associate and director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University.
2009-11-13 06:00:00
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