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[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] Michael Eisenstadt - In Iran, the stage may now be set for a violent showdown. Past experience, however, raises questions whether the security forces can be uniformly relied on to implement an order to violently quash the protests, and whether such an order could spark unrest within the ranks of the security forces. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, responsible for protecting the regime, is riven by the same divisions as Iranian society. For the past two decades, the IRGC has increasingly come to rely on conscripts to meet its manpower needs, due to a drastic decline in volunteers. This raises questions about the political reliability of the IRGC should it be needed to quell popular unrest. While the Basij militia is in the lead in dealing with the unrest, it is a volunteer force that many join for opportunistic reasons - for a paycheck, a scholarship, or a bit of authority. While the Basij is more thoroughly vetted than other organizations (due to the role of local clerics and mosques in the recruitment process), it is hard to believe that its membership is insulated from the broader political forces at work in Iranian society. Accordingly, some units might experience significant desertions if employed to violently suppress the protests. The writer is a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute's Military and Security Studies Program. 2009-06-26 06:00:00Full Article
The Security Forces of the Islamic Republic and the Fate of the Opposition
[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] Michael Eisenstadt - In Iran, the stage may now be set for a violent showdown. Past experience, however, raises questions whether the security forces can be uniformly relied on to implement an order to violently quash the protests, and whether such an order could spark unrest within the ranks of the security forces. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, responsible for protecting the regime, is riven by the same divisions as Iranian society. For the past two decades, the IRGC has increasingly come to rely on conscripts to meet its manpower needs, due to a drastic decline in volunteers. This raises questions about the political reliability of the IRGC should it be needed to quell popular unrest. While the Basij militia is in the lead in dealing with the unrest, it is a volunteer force that many join for opportunistic reasons - for a paycheck, a scholarship, or a bit of authority. While the Basij is more thoroughly vetted than other organizations (due to the role of local clerics and mosques in the recruitment process), it is hard to believe that its membership is insulated from the broader political forces at work in Iranian society. Accordingly, some units might experience significant desertions if employed to violently suppress the protests. The writer is a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute's Military and Security Studies Program. 2009-06-26 06:00:00Full Article
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