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- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
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- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
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- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
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[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] Kenneth Stein - When the Carter administration took office in 1977, it sought but failed to convene an international conference with all concerned parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, which refused to recognize Israel's existence. And without consulting Israel, Egypt, or the U.S. Congress, the Carter administration decided to invite the Soviet Union to play an influential role in resumed Arab-Israeli negotiations. The initial approach of the Carter administration failed. In addition, the administration failed to realize that Sadat and Begin were already negotiating directly through their emissaries. An impatient Carter administration often aligned itself with Sadat, who wanted quick action; it viewed Israel's slowness in the negotiating process as a stalling tactic. But unlike Egypt, where Sadat could essentially make unilateral decisions, Israel requires collective cabinet approval. The new U.S. administration can play a constructive role if misunderstandings like these can be avoided. The writer, author of Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (1999), teaches Middle Eastern history and political science at Emory University. 2009-03-26 06:00:00Full Article
The Egyptian-Israeli Peace: Lessons for Today
[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] Kenneth Stein - When the Carter administration took office in 1977, it sought but failed to convene an international conference with all concerned parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, which refused to recognize Israel's existence. And without consulting Israel, Egypt, or the U.S. Congress, the Carter administration decided to invite the Soviet Union to play an influential role in resumed Arab-Israeli negotiations. The initial approach of the Carter administration failed. In addition, the administration failed to realize that Sadat and Begin were already negotiating directly through their emissaries. An impatient Carter administration often aligned itself with Sadat, who wanted quick action; it viewed Israel's slowness in the negotiating process as a stalling tactic. But unlike Egypt, where Sadat could essentially make unilateral decisions, Israel requires collective cabinet approval. The new U.S. administration can play a constructive role if misunderstandings like these can be avoided. The writer, author of Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (1999), teaches Middle Eastern history and political science at Emory University. 2009-03-26 06:00:00Full Article
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