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[Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University] Ephraim Asculai - This hitherto unknown second uranium enrichment facility is located inside a mountain near the ancient city of Qom and designed to hold some 3,000 gas centrifuges. The purpose of this enrichment plant cannot have been for Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The U.S. still holds by its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment that Iran's military nuclear program was stopped in 2003. Yet three possibilities must be taken into account: a) that the NIE assessment is correct; b) that there is simply a lack of intelligence concerning this program; and c) that the program was already finalized by 2003. This last one can be correct if Iran received the design of the nuclear explosive device from Pakistan, in the same way that Libya reportedly did. Taking the NIE as a solid indication that Iran mended its ways would be a gross error. The writer worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission for over 40 years. 2009-09-30 06:00:00Full Article
The Implications of Iran's Second Enrichment Plant
[Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University] Ephraim Asculai - This hitherto unknown second uranium enrichment facility is located inside a mountain near the ancient city of Qom and designed to hold some 3,000 gas centrifuges. The purpose of this enrichment plant cannot have been for Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The U.S. still holds by its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment that Iran's military nuclear program was stopped in 2003. Yet three possibilities must be taken into account: a) that the NIE assessment is correct; b) that there is simply a lack of intelligence concerning this program; and c) that the program was already finalized by 2003. This last one can be correct if Iran received the design of the nuclear explosive device from Pakistan, in the same way that Libya reportedly did. Taking the NIE as a solid indication that Iran mended its ways would be a gross error. The writer worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission for over 40 years. 2009-09-30 06:00:00Full Article
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