Home
Archives
Jerusalem Center Homepage
View the current issue
Jerusalem Center Videos
Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
[Jerusalem Post] Lenny Ben-David - Despite all of the Arab attacks in 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1936, the British response was to reward Arab aggression against the Jews and impose draconian restrictions on Jewish immigration. The pattern of Arab attacks and rewards would repeat itself time and again. Arab states, terrorist groups and the Palestinian Arabs believed that they could wage "wars of limited liability." They could unleash attacks with impunity in an attempt to wipe out Israel, convinced that if they were defeated they could return to a status quo ante, or even achieve diplomatically what they couldn't win on the battlefield. Territories captured by Israel would be returned and not annexed, terrorist leaders would be honored and not condemned, and Jews/Israel would be blamed. Despite Arab aggression against the Jewish communities in Palestine in 1947 and 1948, Palestinian Arabs still demand today a "right of return" to areas within Israel's borders since the 1949 Armistice. In 1956, Egyptian-commanded fedayeen terrorist attacks led Israel to join Britain and France in the Sinai campaign against Egypt. Two days into the war, President Dwight Eisenhower called Israel's Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. According to a biographer of Jewish leader Max Fisher, Eisenhower admonished Prime Minister Ben-Gurion: "You ought not forget that the strength of Israel and her future are bound up with the United States." This was followed by specific threats: If Israel did not leave Sinai and Gaza there would be UN condemnation, U.S. aid would be terminated, the tax-status of charitable contributions would be challenged." In 1957, the U.S. pressure forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai without securing ironclad guarantees against Egyptian aggression and blockades. In October 1965, Max Fisher visited Eisenhower at his Gettysburg farm. Eisenhower admitted to him: "Looking back at Suez, I regret what I did. I never should have pressed Israel to evacuate the Sinai." 2009-08-07 06:00:00Full Article
There Are Consequences for Choosing Aggression
[Jerusalem Post] Lenny Ben-David - Despite all of the Arab attacks in 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1936, the British response was to reward Arab aggression against the Jews and impose draconian restrictions on Jewish immigration. The pattern of Arab attacks and rewards would repeat itself time and again. Arab states, terrorist groups and the Palestinian Arabs believed that they could wage "wars of limited liability." They could unleash attacks with impunity in an attempt to wipe out Israel, convinced that if they were defeated they could return to a status quo ante, or even achieve diplomatically what they couldn't win on the battlefield. Territories captured by Israel would be returned and not annexed, terrorist leaders would be honored and not condemned, and Jews/Israel would be blamed. Despite Arab aggression against the Jewish communities in Palestine in 1947 and 1948, Palestinian Arabs still demand today a "right of return" to areas within Israel's borders since the 1949 Armistice. In 1956, Egyptian-commanded fedayeen terrorist attacks led Israel to join Britain and France in the Sinai campaign against Egypt. Two days into the war, President Dwight Eisenhower called Israel's Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. According to a biographer of Jewish leader Max Fisher, Eisenhower admonished Prime Minister Ben-Gurion: "You ought not forget that the strength of Israel and her future are bound up with the United States." This was followed by specific threats: If Israel did not leave Sinai and Gaza there would be UN condemnation, U.S. aid would be terminated, the tax-status of charitable contributions would be challenged." In 1957, the U.S. pressure forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai without securing ironclad guarantees against Egyptian aggression and blockades. In October 1965, Max Fisher visited Eisenhower at his Gettysburg farm. Eisenhower admitted to him: "Looking back at Suez, I regret what I did. I never should have pressed Israel to evacuate the Sinai." 2009-08-07 06:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
|
Search:
|