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- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
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- David Ignatius
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- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
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Think Tanks:
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Media:
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(Ha'aretz) Emily B. Landau - As 2009 draws to a close and President Obama takes stock of his diplomatic overture to Iran, he will not be able to avoid the conclusion that his approach so far has achieved next to nothing: Iran continues to progress, without consequences, toward military nuclear capability. The one hope for a breakthrough - the nuclear fuel deal offered in October - was rejected by Iran, which responded with further defiance. The Americans have undertaken to convince Iran to back down from a goal that it is highly motivated and determined to achieve. This means that the diplomatic process must be a game of hardball if it is to succeed. Iran's unwillingness to cooperate is due to the fact that the cooperation demanded simply doesn't serve Iran's perceived interest. This was made clear in 2009 with the proposed fuel deal. The foremost challenge for the U.S., thus, is not to build confidence, but to demonstrate resolve while formulating the contours of a deal that Iran also has a clear interest in pursuing. This means that the U.S. must not waste any more time trying to negotiate interim deals with Iran that are devised either to test whether its intentions are peaceful, or to build confidence. It should be focused on the final deal, which it should negotiate with Iran bilaterally. As long as the P5+1 countries are not on the same page with regard to Iran, the multilateral format weakens their collective ability to confront it with the necessary determination. The U.S. must also find a way to communicate true resolve to Iran. Projecting the idea that there is no realistic scenario in which the U.S. would use military force is counterproductive in this regard, as are hints that the U.S. could successfully contain a nuclear Iran. Only the U.S. can fulfill the role of the determined bilateral negotiator. But if the message it conveys is that it lacks the political will to make Iran a top diplomatic priority, or if it shies away from the bilateral format, then diplomacy doesn't stand a chance. The writer is senior research fellow and director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. 2009-12-25 08:17:52Full Article
Time to Be Tough with Iran
(Ha'aretz) Emily B. Landau - As 2009 draws to a close and President Obama takes stock of his diplomatic overture to Iran, he will not be able to avoid the conclusion that his approach so far has achieved next to nothing: Iran continues to progress, without consequences, toward military nuclear capability. The one hope for a breakthrough - the nuclear fuel deal offered in October - was rejected by Iran, which responded with further defiance. The Americans have undertaken to convince Iran to back down from a goal that it is highly motivated and determined to achieve. This means that the diplomatic process must be a game of hardball if it is to succeed. Iran's unwillingness to cooperate is due to the fact that the cooperation demanded simply doesn't serve Iran's perceived interest. This was made clear in 2009 with the proposed fuel deal. The foremost challenge for the U.S., thus, is not to build confidence, but to demonstrate resolve while formulating the contours of a deal that Iran also has a clear interest in pursuing. This means that the U.S. must not waste any more time trying to negotiate interim deals with Iran that are devised either to test whether its intentions are peaceful, or to build confidence. It should be focused on the final deal, which it should negotiate with Iran bilaterally. As long as the P5+1 countries are not on the same page with regard to Iran, the multilateral format weakens their collective ability to confront it with the necessary determination. The U.S. must also find a way to communicate true resolve to Iran. Projecting the idea that there is no realistic scenario in which the U.S. would use military force is counterproductive in this regard, as are hints that the U.S. could successfully contain a nuclear Iran. Only the U.S. can fulfill the role of the determined bilateral negotiator. But if the message it conveys is that it lacks the political will to make Iran a top diplomatic priority, or if it shies away from the bilateral format, then diplomacy doesn't stand a chance. The writer is senior research fellow and director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. 2009-12-25 08:17:52Full Article
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