Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Post) Jackson Diehl - Lesson No. 1 from history is that there will always be a provocation that threatens to derail Israeli-Palestinian peace talks - before they start, when they start and regularly thereafter. Israeli settlement announcements are among the most common, along with the orchestration by West Bank Palestinians of violent demonstrations and attacks from Gaza by Hamas. The Obama administration saw all three in the past 10 days: It went ballistic over one and barely registered the other two. The trick is not to let the provocation become the center of attention but instead to insist on proceeding with the negotiations. On settlements, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice adopted a pragmatic guideline she called the "Google Earth test": A settlement that visibly expanded was a problem; one that remained within its existing territorial boundary was not. The virtue of this is that Rice got the Israelis and Palestinians talking not about settlements but what they really needed to be discussing - the future Palestine. Former Prime Minister Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas went over everything: the border, the future of Jerusalem and its holy sites, security arrangements, Palestinian refugees. Privately, they agreed on a lot. Eventually, Olmert presented Abbas with a detailed plan for a final settlement - one that, in its concessions to Palestinian demands, went beyond anything either Israel or the U.S. had ever put forward. Confronted with a draft deal that would have been cheered by most of the world, Abbas balked. He refused to sign on; he refused to present a counteroffer. Behind Obama's deliberate fight with Netanyahu last week seemed to lie a calculation that a peace settlement will require the U.S. to bend or break Israel's current government. That might be true; it's almost certainly the case that Netanyahu would not accept the terms that Olmert offered. But behind that obstacle lies another - the recalcitrance of Abbas - that the new administration has been slow to recognize. 2010-03-22 10:13:55Full Article
A Familiar Obstacle to Mideast Peace: Mahmoud Abbas
(Washington Post) Jackson Diehl - Lesson No. 1 from history is that there will always be a provocation that threatens to derail Israeli-Palestinian peace talks - before they start, when they start and regularly thereafter. Israeli settlement announcements are among the most common, along with the orchestration by West Bank Palestinians of violent demonstrations and attacks from Gaza by Hamas. The Obama administration saw all three in the past 10 days: It went ballistic over one and barely registered the other two. The trick is not to let the provocation become the center of attention but instead to insist on proceeding with the negotiations. On settlements, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice adopted a pragmatic guideline she called the "Google Earth test": A settlement that visibly expanded was a problem; one that remained within its existing territorial boundary was not. The virtue of this is that Rice got the Israelis and Palestinians talking not about settlements but what they really needed to be discussing - the future Palestine. Former Prime Minister Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas went over everything: the border, the future of Jerusalem and its holy sites, security arrangements, Palestinian refugees. Privately, they agreed on a lot. Eventually, Olmert presented Abbas with a detailed plan for a final settlement - one that, in its concessions to Palestinian demands, went beyond anything either Israel or the U.S. had ever put forward. Confronted with a draft deal that would have been cheered by most of the world, Abbas balked. He refused to sign on; he refused to present a counteroffer. Behind Obama's deliberate fight with Netanyahu last week seemed to lie a calculation that a peace settlement will require the U.S. to bend or break Israel's current government. That might be true; it's almost certainly the case that Netanyahu would not accept the terms that Olmert offered. But behind that obstacle lies another - the recalcitrance of Abbas - that the new administration has been slow to recognize. 2010-03-22 10:13:55Full Article
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