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- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
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- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
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Think Tanks:
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Media:
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(Institute for Contemporary Affairs-Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) Elliott Abrams - The letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon of April 14, 2004, was a return to the key elements of U.S. policy since 1967 developed under President Johnson - the idea that there would be no return to the situation before June 1967; that the so-called '67 borders were incapable of providing Israel with adequate defense and would change. The Bush letter makes no reference to the '67 borders. It refers to "the armistice lines of 1949." President Bush stated U.S. policy in a speech in the Rose Garden on June 24, 2002, where he called for "new Palestinian leadership." It included the understanding that peace was not going to be made as it had been made with Jordan and Egypt, because Israel and the Palestinians were more deeply intertwined. Security for Israel depended also on what happened inside Palestinian society. The "incitement" issue is not trivial or marginal. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians, the location of the border and what is on the other side of that border are equally important. President Bush said that the Palestinians needed institutions of statehood where those who are in charge of education policy are not nursing ancient hatreds. Israel should not back away from the incitement issue because it is a security issue. Similarly, those who back away from the idea of defensible borders are making a huge mistake. Presumably they think defensible borders are too much to ask for. But there will be no peace with the '67 lines, as has been understood since 1967. Clarity about the fact that those lines will change actually promotes peace. The point is to reflect the reality on the ground and establish the basis for a peace that can last. We need to stick to the basics and what is most basic is security. The writer is former Senior Director for the Near East on the U.S. National Security Council, and Deputy National Security Adviser handling Middle East affairs in the George W. Bush administration. 2010-08-23 08:20:43Full Article
Back to Basics on Israel's Security Needs
(Institute for Contemporary Affairs-Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) Elliott Abrams - The letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon of April 14, 2004, was a return to the key elements of U.S. policy since 1967 developed under President Johnson - the idea that there would be no return to the situation before June 1967; that the so-called '67 borders were incapable of providing Israel with adequate defense and would change. The Bush letter makes no reference to the '67 borders. It refers to "the armistice lines of 1949." President Bush stated U.S. policy in a speech in the Rose Garden on June 24, 2002, where he called for "new Palestinian leadership." It included the understanding that peace was not going to be made as it had been made with Jordan and Egypt, because Israel and the Palestinians were more deeply intertwined. Security for Israel depended also on what happened inside Palestinian society. The "incitement" issue is not trivial or marginal. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians, the location of the border and what is on the other side of that border are equally important. President Bush said that the Palestinians needed institutions of statehood where those who are in charge of education policy are not nursing ancient hatreds. Israel should not back away from the incitement issue because it is a security issue. Similarly, those who back away from the idea of defensible borders are making a huge mistake. Presumably they think defensible borders are too much to ask for. But there will be no peace with the '67 lines, as has been understood since 1967. Clarity about the fact that those lines will change actually promotes peace. The point is to reflect the reality on the ground and establish the basis for a peace that can last. We need to stick to the basics and what is most basic is security. The writer is former Senior Director for the Near East on the U.S. National Security Council, and Deputy National Security Adviser handling Middle East affairs in the George W. Bush administration. 2010-08-23 08:20:43Full Article
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