Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Michael Herzog - When inviting the parties to direct negotiations, Washington abstained from issuing terms of reference. The Palestinian Authority demanded that the baseline for talks be the 1967 lines with agreed swaps, which Israel rejected as an unwarranted precondition that would establish a single-issue endgame (i.e., on territory) before negotiations even began. This seemingly technical issue is likely to become a substantive one. The PA has prioritized the territorial endgame as a prerequisite for compromise on other core issues. But security is the first priority for the Israeli government, which will not yield major territorial concessions until it is sure that the resultant Palestinian state would be effectively demilitarized and non-threatening. To bypass such an impasse, past negotiations were based on the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." This proved to be an obstacle when the parties failed to bridge gaps on all core issues: "all or nothing" resulted in nothing and prevented incremental steps forward. It is time to adopt a less rigid formula that allows for progress even if the parties cannot reach a comprehensive agreement. In statesmanship it is always advisable to contemplate a Plan B in case Plan A is derailed. Currently, only the PA seems to be doing so via its West Bank state-building process, coupled with fostering the idea of seeking UN recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines. While the state-building process should be encouraged by all, the U.S. would do well, at this stage, to dispel Palestinian hopes of adding a unilateral diplomatic layer to the negotiations. The writer, a retired brigadier general, is the Washington Institute's Milton Fine International Fellow, based in Israel. 2010-09-14 07:25:30Full Article
Setting the Parameters for Success in Peace Talks
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Michael Herzog - When inviting the parties to direct negotiations, Washington abstained from issuing terms of reference. The Palestinian Authority demanded that the baseline for talks be the 1967 lines with agreed swaps, which Israel rejected as an unwarranted precondition that would establish a single-issue endgame (i.e., on territory) before negotiations even began. This seemingly technical issue is likely to become a substantive one. The PA has prioritized the territorial endgame as a prerequisite for compromise on other core issues. But security is the first priority for the Israeli government, which will not yield major territorial concessions until it is sure that the resultant Palestinian state would be effectively demilitarized and non-threatening. To bypass such an impasse, past negotiations were based on the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." This proved to be an obstacle when the parties failed to bridge gaps on all core issues: "all or nothing" resulted in nothing and prevented incremental steps forward. It is time to adopt a less rigid formula that allows for progress even if the parties cannot reach a comprehensive agreement. In statesmanship it is always advisable to contemplate a Plan B in case Plan A is derailed. Currently, only the PA seems to be doing so via its West Bank state-building process, coupled with fostering the idea of seeking UN recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines. While the state-building process should be encouraged by all, the U.S. would do well, at this stage, to dispel Palestinian hopes of adding a unilateral diplomatic layer to the negotiations. The writer, a retired brigadier general, is the Washington Institute's Milton Fine International Fellow, based in Israel. 2010-09-14 07:25:30Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|