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Media:
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(Hudson Institute-New York) Mark Silverberg - As Harold Rhode, recently of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, wrote for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, it is crucial to understand the mindset of our enemies. Dealing specifically with Iran, but implying that the Arab dictators and despots of the Middle East move to the same beat, Rhode concludes that the paradigms that govern U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East today are totally at odds with the paradigms that actually govern the actions of our enemies. As Rhode notes: Compromise, as we understand the concept, is seen by the other side "as a sign of submission and weakness" that brings shame and dishonor on those - and on the families of those - who concede. Our efforts at compromise, contrition, accommodation and appeasement are perceived as symbolic of our weakness; and our attempts to find common cause with our enemies merely reinforce their belief that we are "paper tigers," to use bin Laden's term, and easy prey. "It is for this reason that good-will and confidence-building measures should be avoided at all costs," he says, as our Western cultural biases make it easy to misunderstand the true intentions of our enemies. Our adversaries - Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizbullah - see "negotiations" and our desire for dialogue as opportunities to "best others, to demonstrate power," and to make certain that we know who is in control. Under such circumstances, good-will and confidence-building measures by the West are interpreted as a lack of strength or resolve. As Rhode also notes, in the wake of the Iranian hostage-taking crisis, "Iran put the hostages on a plane less than an hour before Ronald Reagan became president. The hostages left Iranian airspace when Reagan raised his hand and took the oath of office. The Iranian 'students' believed Reagan was a cowboy and feared he would 'level' Tehran....Interestingly, during the hostage crisis, a group of Iranian terrorists also occupied the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. But they quickly left, because Moscow informed Tehran that if the Iranians did not leave the Soviet Embassy within hours, Tehran would be bombed," and they knew the Russians meant it. 2010-09-27 09:04:42Full Article
Negotiating in the Middle East - How the Other Side Sees It
(Hudson Institute-New York) Mark Silverberg - As Harold Rhode, recently of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, wrote for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, it is crucial to understand the mindset of our enemies. Dealing specifically with Iran, but implying that the Arab dictators and despots of the Middle East move to the same beat, Rhode concludes that the paradigms that govern U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East today are totally at odds with the paradigms that actually govern the actions of our enemies. As Rhode notes: Compromise, as we understand the concept, is seen by the other side "as a sign of submission and weakness" that brings shame and dishonor on those - and on the families of those - who concede. Our efforts at compromise, contrition, accommodation and appeasement are perceived as symbolic of our weakness; and our attempts to find common cause with our enemies merely reinforce their belief that we are "paper tigers," to use bin Laden's term, and easy prey. "It is for this reason that good-will and confidence-building measures should be avoided at all costs," he says, as our Western cultural biases make it easy to misunderstand the true intentions of our enemies. Our adversaries - Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizbullah - see "negotiations" and our desire for dialogue as opportunities to "best others, to demonstrate power," and to make certain that we know who is in control. Under such circumstances, good-will and confidence-building measures by the West are interpreted as a lack of strength or resolve. As Rhode also notes, in the wake of the Iranian hostage-taking crisis, "Iran put the hostages on a plane less than an hour before Ronald Reagan became president. The hostages left Iranian airspace when Reagan raised his hand and took the oath of office. The Iranian 'students' believed Reagan was a cowboy and feared he would 'level' Tehran....Interestingly, during the hostage crisis, a group of Iranian terrorists also occupied the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. But they quickly left, because Moscow informed Tehran that if the Iranians did not leave the Soviet Embassy within hours, Tehran would be bombed," and they knew the Russians meant it. 2010-09-27 09:04:42Full Article
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