Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Tablet) Benny Morris - Starting with the Israeli handover of West Bank cities and Gaza to the Palestinian Authority in the mid-1990s, the Palestinians, ever-so-slowly and inefficiently, have built pre-state institutions of governance - most recently and competently under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. During the past few years Western observers have noted substantial improvements in Palestinian taxation, infrastructure, and economic development, and in the functioning of the (American- and European-trained) security services. Indeed, under Fayyad, the West Bank is a largely peaceful place, with residents even paying traffic tickets, and militants of Hamas and other organizations largely inactive. However, "negotiations" are unlikely to lead to a peace treaty or even a "framework" agreement for a future peace accord due to a set of obstacles that I see as insurmountable, given current political-ideological mindsets. The first is that Palestinian political elites are dead set against partitioning the Land of Israel/Palestine with the Jews. They regard all of Palestine as their patrimony and believe that it will eventually be theirs. They do not want a permanent two-state solution. Hamas, which may represent the majority of the Palestinian people, openly repudiates a two-state solution. The secular Palestinian leadership is more flexible on the tactics. They express a readiness for a two-state solution but envision such an outcome as intermediate and temporary. This is why Fatah's leaders, led by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, flatly reject the Clintonian formula of "two states for two peoples" and refuse to recognize the "other" state, Israel, as a "Jewish state." They hope that this "other" state will also, in time, be "Arabized," thus setting the stage for the eventual merger of the two states into one Palestinian Arab-majority state. It is hard to envision any circumstances under which the current Obama-initiated direct Israeli-Palestinian peace talks can succeed. Politically, the two contending leaders have little room for maneuver and, at least on the Arab side, little will to concede anything. Abbas might sign off on "an end to the conflict" - and most likely be assassinated by Arab extremists in consequence - but a majority of Palestinians, and certainly a large minority of them, would continue the struggle, rendering the agreement no more than a wind-blown piece of paper. The writer is a professor of history at Ben-Gurion University. 2010-12-09 09:37:33Full Article
Grim Prospects for a Palestinian State
(Tablet) Benny Morris - Starting with the Israeli handover of West Bank cities and Gaza to the Palestinian Authority in the mid-1990s, the Palestinians, ever-so-slowly and inefficiently, have built pre-state institutions of governance - most recently and competently under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. During the past few years Western observers have noted substantial improvements in Palestinian taxation, infrastructure, and economic development, and in the functioning of the (American- and European-trained) security services. Indeed, under Fayyad, the West Bank is a largely peaceful place, with residents even paying traffic tickets, and militants of Hamas and other organizations largely inactive. However, "negotiations" are unlikely to lead to a peace treaty or even a "framework" agreement for a future peace accord due to a set of obstacles that I see as insurmountable, given current political-ideological mindsets. The first is that Palestinian political elites are dead set against partitioning the Land of Israel/Palestine with the Jews. They regard all of Palestine as their patrimony and believe that it will eventually be theirs. They do not want a permanent two-state solution. Hamas, which may represent the majority of the Palestinian people, openly repudiates a two-state solution. The secular Palestinian leadership is more flexible on the tactics. They express a readiness for a two-state solution but envision such an outcome as intermediate and temporary. This is why Fatah's leaders, led by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, flatly reject the Clintonian formula of "two states for two peoples" and refuse to recognize the "other" state, Israel, as a "Jewish state." They hope that this "other" state will also, in time, be "Arabized," thus setting the stage for the eventual merger of the two states into one Palestinian Arab-majority state. It is hard to envision any circumstances under which the current Obama-initiated direct Israeli-Palestinian peace talks can succeed. Politically, the two contending leaders have little room for maneuver and, at least on the Arab side, little will to concede anything. Abbas might sign off on "an end to the conflict" - and most likely be assassinated by Arab extremists in consequence - but a majority of Palestinians, and certainly a large minority of them, would continue the struggle, rendering the agreement no more than a wind-blown piece of paper. The writer is a professor of history at Ben-Gurion University. 2010-12-09 09:37:33Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|