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The Danger of Relying on Cold War Deterrence in the Case of a Nuclear Iran

(Institute for Contemporary Affairs-Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) Shmuel Bar - The policy documents published over the last year by the Obama administration indicate that it believes in the efficacy of traditional Cold War deterrence as the remedy to the challenge of rogue states acquiring nuclear weapons. Another assumption is that the Iranian regime is "rational" and hence deterrable. But the cultural propensity of a people toward "rationality" does not determine the behavior of their autocratic leadership. Furthermore, both Sunni and Shiite traditions of Jihad view the willingness to challenge superior force as an exemplary deed. In Shiite Islam, this is augmented by the idealization of suffering and martyrdom. Failure to prevent Iran from nearing the nuclear threshold will undoubtedly intensify the drive of other states in the region for nuclear weapons. Given weak command and control structures in the region, nuclear weapons may filter down to quasi-states (such as Kurdistan or the Palestinian Authority), terrorist organizations, and rival ethnic groups. The countries of the region will probably be more predisposed than the Cold War protagonists to brandish their nuclear weapons not only rhetorically but through nuclear alerts or nuclear tests, leading to situations of multilateral nuclear escalation that will not be mitigated by Cold War-type hotlines. In addition, the absence of a credible second-strike capability may well strengthen the tendency to opt for a first strike. Dr. Shmuel Bar, Director of Studies at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at IDC Herzliya, served for thirty years in the Israeli intelligence community.
2011-03-07 00:00:00
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