Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Former IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon - * Israel considers the morality of counterterrorist measures within the framework of three tests: the "mirror" test, in which the counterterrorist executor asks whether the policy meets his own ethical standards; the "our own society" test, in which a policymaker must consider whether the policy meets the moral standards of his broader society; and the "international" test, which considers whether the policy satisfies internationally recognized moral standards, as well as what would be the response of the international community. * The short-term battle against the terrorists is ultimately a cost-benefit analysis of lives lost versus lives saved by a given operation. Preventing collateral damage while targeting terrorists is therefore essential; during the past five years of conflict, Israel often declined to attack terrorist leaders when they were in densely populated areas for fear of inflicting collateral damage. Yet the consequence for not acting against terrorists due to concern for civilian casualties was often more terrorist attacks and Israeli deaths. * Terrorism can be fought surgically - focusing exclusively on the terrorists - by achieving three advantages: intelligence dominance, which includes the capability to intercept terrorists, foil their financial support systems, and prevent the smuggling of weapons; information dominance, which includes the ability to deliver the intelligence to decision makers, so intelligence can be used effectively and quickly; and operational flexibility and creativity, which include the ability of all arms of the military to arrest or kill terrorists on short notice. * Effective counterterrorism should be based on two guiding principles. The first is that the best defense is a good offense. The second is the imperative never to surrender to terrorism. 2006-01-03 00:00:00Full Article
Lessons from the Fight Against Terrorism
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Former IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon - * Israel considers the morality of counterterrorist measures within the framework of three tests: the "mirror" test, in which the counterterrorist executor asks whether the policy meets his own ethical standards; the "our own society" test, in which a policymaker must consider whether the policy meets the moral standards of his broader society; and the "international" test, which considers whether the policy satisfies internationally recognized moral standards, as well as what would be the response of the international community. * The short-term battle against the terrorists is ultimately a cost-benefit analysis of lives lost versus lives saved by a given operation. Preventing collateral damage while targeting terrorists is therefore essential; during the past five years of conflict, Israel often declined to attack terrorist leaders when they were in densely populated areas for fear of inflicting collateral damage. Yet the consequence for not acting against terrorists due to concern for civilian casualties was often more terrorist attacks and Israeli deaths. * Terrorism can be fought surgically - focusing exclusively on the terrorists - by achieving three advantages: intelligence dominance, which includes the capability to intercept terrorists, foil their financial support systems, and prevent the smuggling of weapons; information dominance, which includes the ability to deliver the intelligence to decision makers, so intelligence can be used effectively and quickly; and operational flexibility and creativity, which include the ability of all arms of the military to arrest or kill terrorists on short notice. * Effective counterterrorism should be based on two guiding principles. The first is that the best defense is a good offense. The second is the imperative never to surrender to terrorism. 2006-01-03 00:00:00Full Article
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