Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Institute for Contemporary Affairs/Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs)Dan Diker - * Some Israeli opinion-makers, seeking to define Sharon's political legacy, are determined to transform him into a political dove due to his unilateral disengagement plan that pulled Israel out of Gaza. They claim that the "new" Sharon was willing to lead Israel in another major pullback - this time from at least 90 percent of the West Bank. This interpretation assumed the West Bank security fence would constitute Israel's eastern border. * However, a careful examination of Sharon's major speeches and interviews since he first proposed disengagement suggests the very opposite. Indeed, on January 6, 2006, Israel Channel 2 television's chief diplomatic correspondent, Udi Segal, disclosed that Sharon told him privately that it was his policy to hold onto eight settlement blocs in the West Bank and not only the three blocs usually mentioned - Ariel, Maale Adumim, and Gush Etzion. Segal added that Sharon did not want to evacuate the Jordan Valley. * Explaining to the Knesset the significance of the U.S. Letter of Assurances he received from President Bush on April 14, 2004, Sharon said: "There is American acknowledgment that in any final status agreement there will be no Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines....This acknowledgment appears in two ways: understanding the facts determined by the large Israeli settlement blocs such as making it impossible to return to the 1967 lines, and implementation of the concept of 'defensible borders.'" * Thus, Sharon saw the disengagement plan as a mechanism for trading land with a dense Palestinian population, like the Gaza Strip, in exchange for land that was critical for Israel's future security: "I am firmly convinced and truly believe that this disengagement will strengthen Israel's hold over territory which is essential to our existence." * In private conversations with close friends, Sharon has repeated the traditional "defensible borders" position, and has reiterated in various interviews and public statements since the Gaza disengagement that Israel would retain close to half of the West Bank, as opposed to the single digit percentages that his advisors appear to be advancing. 2006-01-13 00:00:00Full Article
Sharon's Strategic Legacy for Israel: Competing Perspectives
(Institute for Contemporary Affairs/Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs)Dan Diker - * Some Israeli opinion-makers, seeking to define Sharon's political legacy, are determined to transform him into a political dove due to his unilateral disengagement plan that pulled Israel out of Gaza. They claim that the "new" Sharon was willing to lead Israel in another major pullback - this time from at least 90 percent of the West Bank. This interpretation assumed the West Bank security fence would constitute Israel's eastern border. * However, a careful examination of Sharon's major speeches and interviews since he first proposed disengagement suggests the very opposite. Indeed, on January 6, 2006, Israel Channel 2 television's chief diplomatic correspondent, Udi Segal, disclosed that Sharon told him privately that it was his policy to hold onto eight settlement blocs in the West Bank and not only the three blocs usually mentioned - Ariel, Maale Adumim, and Gush Etzion. Segal added that Sharon did not want to evacuate the Jordan Valley. * Explaining to the Knesset the significance of the U.S. Letter of Assurances he received from President Bush on April 14, 2004, Sharon said: "There is American acknowledgment that in any final status agreement there will be no Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines....This acknowledgment appears in two ways: understanding the facts determined by the large Israeli settlement blocs such as making it impossible to return to the 1967 lines, and implementation of the concept of 'defensible borders.'" * Thus, Sharon saw the disengagement plan as a mechanism for trading land with a dense Palestinian population, like the Gaza Strip, in exchange for land that was critical for Israel's future security: "I am firmly convinced and truly believe that this disengagement will strengthen Israel's hold over territory which is essential to our existence." * In private conversations with close friends, Sharon has repeated the traditional "defensible borders" position, and has reiterated in various interviews and public statements since the Gaza disengagement that Israel would retain close to half of the West Bank, as opposed to the single digit percentages that his advisors appear to be advancing. 2006-01-13 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|