Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) Anat Kurz - * Israel has posed three preconditions for any dialogue with Hamas: dismantling the terrorist infrastructure, accepting all previously contracted agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, and repudiating those parts of the Hamas covenant denying Israel's right to exist. Until these conditions are met, Israel is prepared to boycott the Palestinian Authority. * Hamas' first priority now is to institutionalize its rule. That, and not a desire to implement the first stage of the road map in order to lay the groundwork for talks with Israel, is what explains its continued commitment to the tahdi'a (calm). * Moreover, any deviation from the principles that have guided the movement since its founding might undermine its internal cohesiveness; Hamas could hardly undertake such a shift without inviting internal schisms and fragmentation. * Hamas' rise to power changes little in the substance of Israel's relations with the PA as they have evolved over the past few years. Although the road map has not been officially buried, it has for years lacked any operational significance. * Long before Hamas came to power, Israel concluded that there was no viable Palestinian partner, and it is therefore highly doubtful whether a Fatah victory in the elections would have resulted in a reality different enough to justify the revival of substantive negotiations. In other words, non-negotiation with a Fatah-led PA will now be succeeded by non-negotiation with a Hamas-led PA. 2006-02-24 00:00:00Full Article
After the Hamas Victory
(Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) Anat Kurz - * Israel has posed three preconditions for any dialogue with Hamas: dismantling the terrorist infrastructure, accepting all previously contracted agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, and repudiating those parts of the Hamas covenant denying Israel's right to exist. Until these conditions are met, Israel is prepared to boycott the Palestinian Authority. * Hamas' first priority now is to institutionalize its rule. That, and not a desire to implement the first stage of the road map in order to lay the groundwork for talks with Israel, is what explains its continued commitment to the tahdi'a (calm). * Moreover, any deviation from the principles that have guided the movement since its founding might undermine its internal cohesiveness; Hamas could hardly undertake such a shift without inviting internal schisms and fragmentation. * Hamas' rise to power changes little in the substance of Israel's relations with the PA as they have evolved over the past few years. Although the road map has not been officially buried, it has for years lacked any operational significance. * Long before Hamas came to power, Israel concluded that there was no viable Palestinian partner, and it is therefore highly doubtful whether a Fatah victory in the elections would have resulted in a reality different enough to justify the revival of substantive negotiations. In other words, non-negotiation with a Fatah-led PA will now be succeeded by non-negotiation with a Hamas-led PA. 2006-02-24 00:00:00Full Article
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