Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Jerusalem Post) David Horovitz - * If Abu Mazen succeeds, with the help of the Egyptians and others, in bringing down the level of violence over a period of time - a period of several months - it will be very difficult for Israel to say that this is unacceptable. There will be pressure on Israel to begin negotiating within the confines of the road map - even though, technically speaking, the steps that were taken in order to [reduce violence] were not exactly the steps which were outlined in the road map. * I have maintained from the outset that the road map was an aberration. It is based not only on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, it also mentions the Saudi initiative and other resolutions. The road map itself was approved by the Security Council....It is not only accepted by the parties, but is the official document which is the basis for the future. And the fact that Israel has reservations on "14 points" is immaterial. The 14 points were not accepted even by the United States. * The ultimate judgment of whether Stage A or Stage B [of the road map] has been obtained is in the hands of the Quartet, not in the hands of the parties. This is the beginning of an imposed solution. The whole structure of the road map creates an international forum which sort of adjudicates, it doesn't just monitor, the situation. * The concept of the unilateral disengagement as it was presented was that unilateral disengagement would create a new situation which would last for some time, the assumption being that the parties were not ripe for final status negotiations. 2005-01-05 00:00:00Full Article
Dangers Awaiting Israel from the Road Map Process - Interview with Former Mossad Head Ephraim Halevy
(Jerusalem Post) David Horovitz - * If Abu Mazen succeeds, with the help of the Egyptians and others, in bringing down the level of violence over a period of time - a period of several months - it will be very difficult for Israel to say that this is unacceptable. There will be pressure on Israel to begin negotiating within the confines of the road map - even though, technically speaking, the steps that were taken in order to [reduce violence] were not exactly the steps which were outlined in the road map. * I have maintained from the outset that the road map was an aberration. It is based not only on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, it also mentions the Saudi initiative and other resolutions. The road map itself was approved by the Security Council....It is not only accepted by the parties, but is the official document which is the basis for the future. And the fact that Israel has reservations on "14 points" is immaterial. The 14 points were not accepted even by the United States. * The ultimate judgment of whether Stage A or Stage B [of the road map] has been obtained is in the hands of the Quartet, not in the hands of the parties. This is the beginning of an imposed solution. The whole structure of the road map creates an international forum which sort of adjudicates, it doesn't just monitor, the situation. * The concept of the unilateral disengagement as it was presented was that unilateral disengagement would create a new situation which would last for some time, the assumption being that the parties were not ripe for final status negotiations. 2005-01-05 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|