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(Institute for Contemporary Affairs/Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi - * The election of Abu Mazen, along with Israel's political and military pressure, has brought about a change in the Palestinian Authority's policy on continuing the "armed intifada." At the same time, the paramount interest of Hamas and Islamic Jihad is to reorganize and rebuild their capabilities after they were severely degraded by the Israel Defense Forces. * The "calm" that the terror organizations are supplying is aimed primarily at enabling the Palestinian Authority to negotiate a hudna (cessation of hostilities) with Israel from a more comfortable political position in which the political "ball" is in Israel's court. * The hudna offered by the Palestinians has two main aspects: that it be mutually obligatory, and that it be conditional on Israel's performance with regard to a long list of Palestinian demands (releasing prisoners, ceasing military actions in the PA territories, removing checkpoints, resolving the status of wanted fugitives, stopping the construction of the security fence, etc.). * According to the expanded Palestinian concept of hudna, "resistance to occupation" remains legitimate, along with a readiness to renew the struggle against Israel simultaneously with the opening of political channels. * While the opportunities presented by the new political reality include a de facto end of the armed intifada, the return of normality to the PA, and the coordination of the disengagement, there are also risks for Israel. These include a failure to dismantle the terror infrastructure, international pressure on Israel to show flexibility and restraint even after outbreaks of terror, and acceptance of Hamas's integration into the PA - in effect, acquiescing to that organization's political legitimacy. 2005-02-07 00:00:00Full Article
The Palestinian "Temporary Cease-Fire": Israel's Political Risks and Opportunities with the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit Between Prime Minister Sharon and C
(Institute for Contemporary Affairs/Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi - * The election of Abu Mazen, along with Israel's political and military pressure, has brought about a change in the Palestinian Authority's policy on continuing the "armed intifada." At the same time, the paramount interest of Hamas and Islamic Jihad is to reorganize and rebuild their capabilities after they were severely degraded by the Israel Defense Forces. * The "calm" that the terror organizations are supplying is aimed primarily at enabling the Palestinian Authority to negotiate a hudna (cessation of hostilities) with Israel from a more comfortable political position in which the political "ball" is in Israel's court. * The hudna offered by the Palestinians has two main aspects: that it be mutually obligatory, and that it be conditional on Israel's performance with regard to a long list of Palestinian demands (releasing prisoners, ceasing military actions in the PA territories, removing checkpoints, resolving the status of wanted fugitives, stopping the construction of the security fence, etc.). * According to the expanded Palestinian concept of hudna, "resistance to occupation" remains legitimate, along with a readiness to renew the struggle against Israel simultaneously with the opening of political channels. * While the opportunities presented by the new political reality include a de facto end of the armed intifada, the return of normality to the PA, and the coordination of the disengagement, there are also risks for Israel. These include a failure to dismantle the terror infrastructure, international pressure on Israel to show flexibility and restraint even after outbreaks of terror, and acceptance of Hamas's integration into the PA - in effect, acquiescing to that organization's political legitimacy. 2005-02-07 00:00:00Full Article
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