Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Boston Globe) Charles A. Radin - Within days of the Israeli-Palestinian summit conference last week in Sharm el-Sheikh, the euphoric visions of peace were dissipating amid Kassam rockets, clan killings, and warnings that only actions, not words, could improve matters. The summit was at least the fourth major attempt to negotiate an end to the fighting that erupted in September 2000, and few ordinary people on either side expect the situation to improve quickly, though they may fervently wish that it will. However, there are substantial differences between previous summits and the talks at Sharm el-Sheikh, according to Israeli and Palestinian officials and Western diplomats: Arafat is dead; Abbas is elected, with a popular mandate; incitement against Israel and Jews in the Palestinian media has declined precipitously; Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has taken a leading role this time; the public on both sides is weary of the struggle, and is accepting of Abbas's position that no military solution is possible for either side. Many Palestinians are deeply alarmed at the consequences if Sharon goes through with his intention to disengage Israelis and Palestinians by evacuating Gaza and constructing a security barrier around much of the West Bank. "They hate us in the Gulf....We have only the gate to Israel," said Fahmi al Bahtiti, 48, a Gazan. Even some who support Hamas see Abbas's negotiations with Sharon as the only hope for avoiding a unilateral Israeli pullback that would impose a stifling isolation on them. Sharon's unilateral separation plan "was a gamble that paid off," a U.S. diplomat said, because when Fatah leaders and the Egyptian government saw the potential problems they could experience if Hamas took over in Gaza, "everyone wanted to be involved in the action." Yet Mushir al Masri, Hamas's principal spokesman in Gaza, said, "We do not want the Zionist enemy to pull out of Gaza without paying a political price, and without paying a security price." The "very fragile opportunity" for an end to violence that Sharon hailed at Sharm now depends entirely on whether Abbas and Mubarak can handle Hamas.2005-02-14 00:00:00Full Article
Can Abbas and Mubarak Handle Hamas?
(Boston Globe) Charles A. Radin - Within days of the Israeli-Palestinian summit conference last week in Sharm el-Sheikh, the euphoric visions of peace were dissipating amid Kassam rockets, clan killings, and warnings that only actions, not words, could improve matters. The summit was at least the fourth major attempt to negotiate an end to the fighting that erupted in September 2000, and few ordinary people on either side expect the situation to improve quickly, though they may fervently wish that it will. However, there are substantial differences between previous summits and the talks at Sharm el-Sheikh, according to Israeli and Palestinian officials and Western diplomats: Arafat is dead; Abbas is elected, with a popular mandate; incitement against Israel and Jews in the Palestinian media has declined precipitously; Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has taken a leading role this time; the public on both sides is weary of the struggle, and is accepting of Abbas's position that no military solution is possible for either side. Many Palestinians are deeply alarmed at the consequences if Sharon goes through with his intention to disengage Israelis and Palestinians by evacuating Gaza and constructing a security barrier around much of the West Bank. "They hate us in the Gulf....We have only the gate to Israel," said Fahmi al Bahtiti, 48, a Gazan. Even some who support Hamas see Abbas's negotiations with Sharon as the only hope for avoiding a unilateral Israeli pullback that would impose a stifling isolation on them. Sharon's unilateral separation plan "was a gamble that paid off," a U.S. diplomat said, because when Fatah leaders and the Egyptian government saw the potential problems they could experience if Hamas took over in Gaza, "everyone wanted to be involved in the action." Yet Mushir al Masri, Hamas's principal spokesman in Gaza, said, "We do not want the Zionist enemy to pull out of Gaza without paying a political price, and without paying a security price." The "very fragile opportunity" for an end to violence that Sharon hailed at Sharm now depends entirely on whether Abbas and Mubarak can handle Hamas.2005-02-14 00:00:00Full Article
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