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Media:
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[New Republic] Dennis Ross - The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran presents an interesting paradox: Though almost certainly the product of rigorous assessment and questioning, it may actually leave us less secure over time. How can such an improved product of spycraft have such a negative effect? It can when it frames the issue mistakenly and is not combined with statecraft. Weaponizing is not the issue, developing fissionable materials is because, compared with producing fissionable material which makes up the core of nuclear bombs, weaponizing it is neither particularly difficult nor expensive. The hard part of becoming a nuclear power is enriching uranium or separating out plutonium. And Iran is going full-speed ahead on both. What would the Middle East look like if Iran gained far greater coercive leverage over all its neighbors? Wouldn't we face a region increasingly hostile to our interests? Wouldn't we see the prospect of Arab-Israeli peace diminish as Iran worked to weaken and isolate Israel? And to avoid being at the mercy of Iran, wouldn't the Saudis decide to go nuclear - and wouldn't that impel the Egyptians to do the same? Even the image of Iran as a nuclear power carries with it very dangerous consequences. Sadly, it's now easier for Iran to proceed unimpeded with its nuclear plans. It is far less likely to face the economic (or potentially military) pressures that in 2003 might have persuaded those in the Iranian leadership that the costs of developing their nuclear capabilities were too high. Who in the Iranian elite will argue that or oppose Ahmadinejad's approach to nukes now? No doubt, that is not what the authors of the NIE sought, but here poor statecraft has trumped our improved efforts at spycraft. The writer is counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2007-12-12 01:00:00Full Article
The Dunderheaded Public Roll-Out of the NIE
[New Republic] Dennis Ross - The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran presents an interesting paradox: Though almost certainly the product of rigorous assessment and questioning, it may actually leave us less secure over time. How can such an improved product of spycraft have such a negative effect? It can when it frames the issue mistakenly and is not combined with statecraft. Weaponizing is not the issue, developing fissionable materials is because, compared with producing fissionable material which makes up the core of nuclear bombs, weaponizing it is neither particularly difficult nor expensive. The hard part of becoming a nuclear power is enriching uranium or separating out plutonium. And Iran is going full-speed ahead on both. What would the Middle East look like if Iran gained far greater coercive leverage over all its neighbors? Wouldn't we face a region increasingly hostile to our interests? Wouldn't we see the prospect of Arab-Israeli peace diminish as Iran worked to weaken and isolate Israel? And to avoid being at the mercy of Iran, wouldn't the Saudis decide to go nuclear - and wouldn't that impel the Egyptians to do the same? Even the image of Iran as a nuclear power carries with it very dangerous consequences. Sadly, it's now easier for Iran to proceed unimpeded with its nuclear plans. It is far less likely to face the economic (or potentially military) pressures that in 2003 might have persuaded those in the Iranian leadership that the costs of developing their nuclear capabilities were too high. Who in the Iranian elite will argue that or oppose Ahmadinejad's approach to nukes now? No doubt, that is not what the authors of the NIE sought, but here poor statecraft has trumped our improved efforts at spycraft. The writer is counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2007-12-12 01:00:00Full Article
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