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(Los Angeles Times) Max Boot - Most of the conditions that existed in previous wars won by guerrillas, from Algeria in the 1950s to Afghanistan in the 1980s, aren't present in Iraq. The rebels lack a unifying organization, ideology, and leader. The top militant is Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian who has alienated most of the Iraqi population, even many Sunnis, with his indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Support for the insurgency is confined to a minority within a minority - a small portion of Sunni Arabs, who make up less than 20% of the population. Most of the terror has been confined to four of 18 provinces. The only prominent non-Sunni rebel, Muqtada Sadr, has quietly joined the political process. The biggest weakness of the insurgency is that it is morphing from a war of national liberation into a revolutionary struggle against an elected government. Successful uprisings against elected governments are much rarer because leaders with political legitimacy can more easily rally the population and accommodate aggrieved elements. 2005-06-24 00:00:00Full Article
Why the Rebels in Iraq Will Lose
(Los Angeles Times) Max Boot - Most of the conditions that existed in previous wars won by guerrillas, from Algeria in the 1950s to Afghanistan in the 1980s, aren't present in Iraq. The rebels lack a unifying organization, ideology, and leader. The top militant is Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian who has alienated most of the Iraqi population, even many Sunnis, with his indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Support for the insurgency is confined to a minority within a minority - a small portion of Sunni Arabs, who make up less than 20% of the population. Most of the terror has been confined to four of 18 provinces. The only prominent non-Sunni rebel, Muqtada Sadr, has quietly joined the political process. The biggest weakness of the insurgency is that it is morphing from a war of national liberation into a revolutionary struggle against an elected government. Successful uprisings against elected governments are much rarer because leaders with political legitimacy can more easily rally the population and accommodate aggrieved elements. 2005-06-24 00:00:00Full Article
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