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(Ha'aretz) Zalman Shoval - * Does the death of Arafat in fact herald a basic change in the strategic goals that the Palestinian leadership has posited for itself? * There are two scripts for the day after the disengagement. According to the more optimistic one, there will be a majority among the Palestinian population and its leadership that will say to itself that terror has basically failed, and that an opportunity has been created to rehabilitate the Palestinian economy and to progress toward the establishment of a recognized and well-run political entity, with the practical support of the U.S. * But there is also a pessimistic script, which says that immediately after the withdrawal, a new wave of terror and violence will erupt, directed mainly at the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, but also at places within Israel, in its pre-1967 borders. The goal? To force Israel to make additional far-reaching concessions. * Those behind this strategy are hoping that the U.S. will make every effort to advance at least the appearance of an agreement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - even if that involves pressure on Israel. That was exactly the strategy used by Arafat before and after the Camp David summit, and although it was a total failure, we should not conclude that the Palestinians have learned the lesson. * As both outgoing IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon and former head of the Shin Bet security services Avi Dichter admitted, the Palestinians consider the disengagement a victory of terrorism, regardless of the facts. Moreover, large sectors of the Palestinian camp are in any case not interested in agreements and in compromises according to the "road map" peace plan or any other plan, and their goal remains the destruction of the State of Israel. * Abu Mazen is not Arafat, but his objectives, not only according to intelligence assessments but according to his own statements as well, are no different from those of his predecessor. Even if the truth is on the side of those who say that Abu Mazen's deficient conduct, both with respect to terror and to the reforms that are not being carried out, actually stems from weakness - it makes no difference. What matters are the results. 2005-06-27 00:00:00Full Article
Scripts for the Day After
(Ha'aretz) Zalman Shoval - * Does the death of Arafat in fact herald a basic change in the strategic goals that the Palestinian leadership has posited for itself? * There are two scripts for the day after the disengagement. According to the more optimistic one, there will be a majority among the Palestinian population and its leadership that will say to itself that terror has basically failed, and that an opportunity has been created to rehabilitate the Palestinian economy and to progress toward the establishment of a recognized and well-run political entity, with the practical support of the U.S. * But there is also a pessimistic script, which says that immediately after the withdrawal, a new wave of terror and violence will erupt, directed mainly at the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, but also at places within Israel, in its pre-1967 borders. The goal? To force Israel to make additional far-reaching concessions. * Those behind this strategy are hoping that the U.S. will make every effort to advance at least the appearance of an agreement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - even if that involves pressure on Israel. That was exactly the strategy used by Arafat before and after the Camp David summit, and although it was a total failure, we should not conclude that the Palestinians have learned the lesson. * As both outgoing IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon and former head of the Shin Bet security services Avi Dichter admitted, the Palestinians consider the disengagement a victory of terrorism, regardless of the facts. Moreover, large sectors of the Palestinian camp are in any case not interested in agreements and in compromises according to the "road map" peace plan or any other plan, and their goal remains the destruction of the State of Israel. * Abu Mazen is not Arafat, but his objectives, not only according to intelligence assessments but according to his own statements as well, are no different from those of his predecessor. Even if the truth is on the side of those who say that Abu Mazen's deficient conduct, both with respect to terror and to the reforms that are not being carried out, actually stems from weakness - it makes no difference. What matters are the results. 2005-06-27 00:00:00Full Article
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