Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Los Angeles Times) Edward N. Luttwak - President Bush rightly insists that the U.S. cannot abandon Iraq to the insurgents - a murderous gathering of Arab Sunni supremacists, Saddam Hussein nostalgics, and Salafist terrorists. These last fanatics would become even more dangerous if invigorated by victory in Iraq. But in presenting the victory of the killers as the only alternative to a failing military occupation, Bush is entirely wrong. It is the least likely of all possible outcomes. As U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad keeps reminding us, about 80% of Iraqis are not Sunni Arabs or Baathists, let alone Salafists, out to kill as many non-Sunnis as they can. That 80% majority consists mostly of Arab Shiites and Kurds of all creeds, who jointly dominate the ranks of the fledgling Iraqi army and police force. Because both those forces are still lacking in morale and cohesion, it may be more important and necessary in the meantime for both Kurds and Arab Shiites to have their own well-armed militias. If U.S. forces are withdrawn, the insurgents would not be left triumphantly victorious in the field. They would face much more numerous Arab Shiite and Kurdish militias, as well as the largest part of the new army and police force. What we have now are U.S. troops interposed between the insurgents and our allies in Iraq, in effect protecting our enemies from our friends. As long as U.S. troops stand between them and the insurgents, there is no necessity, no incentive, and no opportunity for joint Kurd-Shiite action. But things are likely to change very quickly if U.S. forces disengage. The writer is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. 2005-10-12 00:00:00Full Article
Withdrawal Isn't Retreat
(Los Angeles Times) Edward N. Luttwak - President Bush rightly insists that the U.S. cannot abandon Iraq to the insurgents - a murderous gathering of Arab Sunni supremacists, Saddam Hussein nostalgics, and Salafist terrorists. These last fanatics would become even more dangerous if invigorated by victory in Iraq. But in presenting the victory of the killers as the only alternative to a failing military occupation, Bush is entirely wrong. It is the least likely of all possible outcomes. As U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad keeps reminding us, about 80% of Iraqis are not Sunni Arabs or Baathists, let alone Salafists, out to kill as many non-Sunnis as they can. That 80% majority consists mostly of Arab Shiites and Kurds of all creeds, who jointly dominate the ranks of the fledgling Iraqi army and police force. Because both those forces are still lacking in morale and cohesion, it may be more important and necessary in the meantime for both Kurds and Arab Shiites to have their own well-armed militias. If U.S. forces are withdrawn, the insurgents would not be left triumphantly victorious in the field. They would face much more numerous Arab Shiite and Kurdish militias, as well as the largest part of the new army and police force. What we have now are U.S. troops interposed between the insurgents and our allies in Iraq, in effect protecting our enemies from our friends. As long as U.S. troops stand between them and the insurgents, there is no necessity, no incentive, and no opportunity for joint Kurd-Shiite action. But things are likely to change very quickly if U.S. forces disengage. The writer is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. 2005-10-12 00:00:00Full Article
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