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(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Zaki Shalom - Today, against the backdrop of the current stalemate in the diplomatic process that seems poised to continue in the foreseeable future, the relevance of the Oslo Accords for implementing a two-state solution is highly questionable. They called for bilateral negotiations under international auspices that were to lead to a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. However, for some time there has been a noticeable trend, which has intensified over the past two years, of abandoning the Oslo format in favor of unilateral steps, either with negotiations, or without them. To a large extent, this trend stems from the assessment by both sides that their ability to fulfill their national interests in the context of bilateral negotiations is very limited, if not nonexistent. Furthermore, each side is skeptical of the desire and/or ability of the other side to accept its minimal basic conditions for a settlement. At the same time, the third party to the agreement, the U.S. administration, seems to be losing confidence in the Oslo format. Instead it exhibits a tendency to rely on its own unilateral actions and those of the Quartet, which the other two parties will be "persuaded" to accept. It appears that President Obama's administration is inclined - for lack of choice, and cognizant of its limitations - to lower its profile regarding a settlement, at least until the domestic situation in the U.S. becomes clear. However, the decision on such a strategic issue is ultimately made by the president alone, and he has already demonstrated an ability to take unexpected steps that go against the common assessment of the situation. The writer is a Principal Research Fellow at INSS. 2011-07-13 00:00:00Full Article
The Peace Process: From Oslo Parameters to Unilateral Actions
(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Zaki Shalom - Today, against the backdrop of the current stalemate in the diplomatic process that seems poised to continue in the foreseeable future, the relevance of the Oslo Accords for implementing a two-state solution is highly questionable. They called for bilateral negotiations under international auspices that were to lead to a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. However, for some time there has been a noticeable trend, which has intensified over the past two years, of abandoning the Oslo format in favor of unilateral steps, either with negotiations, or without them. To a large extent, this trend stems from the assessment by both sides that their ability to fulfill their national interests in the context of bilateral negotiations is very limited, if not nonexistent. Furthermore, each side is skeptical of the desire and/or ability of the other side to accept its minimal basic conditions for a settlement. At the same time, the third party to the agreement, the U.S. administration, seems to be losing confidence in the Oslo format. Instead it exhibits a tendency to rely on its own unilateral actions and those of the Quartet, which the other two parties will be "persuaded" to accept. It appears that President Obama's administration is inclined - for lack of choice, and cognizant of its limitations - to lower its profile regarding a settlement, at least until the domestic situation in the U.S. becomes clear. However, the decision on such a strategic issue is ultimately made by the president alone, and he has already demonstrated an ability to take unexpected steps that go against the common assessment of the situation. The writer is a Principal Research Fellow at INSS. 2011-07-13 00:00:00Full Article
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