Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(New York Times) Flynt Leverett - By linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq war, the president misrepresents the real lesson of the Libyan case. To be fair, some credit should even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans decided in the late 1990s to seek normalized relations with the U.S., and held secret discussions with Clinton administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton White House made clear that no movement toward better relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. The Bush administration picked up on those discussions and induced the Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. During these two years of talks, American negotiators consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie situation would lead to no more than elimination of UN sanctions. To get out from under the separate U.S. sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns, particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass destruction. The Iraq war, which had not yet started, was not the driving force behind Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of credible diplomatic representations by the U.S. over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic goals. The writer was senior director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National Security Council from 2002 to 2003.2004-01-23 00:00:00Full Article
Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb
(New York Times) Flynt Leverett - By linking shifts in Libya's behavior to the Iraq war, the president misrepresents the real lesson of the Libyan case. To be fair, some credit should even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans decided in the late 1990s to seek normalized relations with the U.S., and held secret discussions with Clinton administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton White House made clear that no movement toward better relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. The Bush administration picked up on those discussions and induced the Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. During these two years of talks, American negotiators consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie situation would lead to no more than elimination of UN sanctions. To get out from under the separate U.S. sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns, particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass destruction. The Iraq war, which had not yet started, was not the driving force behind Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of credible diplomatic representations by the U.S. over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic goals. The writer was senior director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National Security Council from 2002 to 2003.2004-01-23 00:00:00Full Article
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