Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(National Interest) Leon Hadar - The changes emerging from the Arab Spring go beyond a clash between pro-Western movements and Islamist groups. The shifting balance of power in the Middle East - triggered in part by eroding American influence in the region - is bringing to the fore realpolitik concerns that likely will overcome ideological considerations. It is not the Egyptian-Israeli treaty agreement of 1979 or the billions of dollars in U.S. economic and military assistance to Egypt that have induced the Egyptians to refrain from going to war with Israel. The 1979 accord reflected the reality that the evolving power balance led both Israel and Egypt to conclude that a war between them would be too costly and detrimental to their interests. Egypt, economically bankrupt and unable to feed and educate its own people, is certainly not positioned to pursue military confrontation with Israel. Hamas may be evolving into a client (mini)state of a more Islamist-oriented Egypt. In that context, Egypt's interest would be in providing Hamas with enough support to prevent it from coming under the influence of the more radical players in the region, such as Iran. At the same time, Cairo would need to ensure that Hamas' policies would not draw Egypt into a military conflict with Israel. This wouldn't likely bring about a peace accord, but might allow the ministate in Gaza to become an Egyptian protectorate of sorts that could coexist with Israel for some time to come. 2011-11-03 00:00:00Full Article
Overhauling U.S. Policy in the Middle East
(National Interest) Leon Hadar - The changes emerging from the Arab Spring go beyond a clash between pro-Western movements and Islamist groups. The shifting balance of power in the Middle East - triggered in part by eroding American influence in the region - is bringing to the fore realpolitik concerns that likely will overcome ideological considerations. It is not the Egyptian-Israeli treaty agreement of 1979 or the billions of dollars in U.S. economic and military assistance to Egypt that have induced the Egyptians to refrain from going to war with Israel. The 1979 accord reflected the reality that the evolving power balance led both Israel and Egypt to conclude that a war between them would be too costly and detrimental to their interests. Egypt, economically bankrupt and unable to feed and educate its own people, is certainly not positioned to pursue military confrontation with Israel. Hamas may be evolving into a client (mini)state of a more Islamist-oriented Egypt. In that context, Egypt's interest would be in providing Hamas with enough support to prevent it from coming under the influence of the more radical players in the region, such as Iran. At the same time, Cairo would need to ensure that Hamas' policies would not draw Egypt into a military conflict with Israel. This wouldn't likely bring about a peace accord, but might allow the ministate in Gaza to become an Egyptian protectorate of sorts that could coexist with Israel for some time to come. 2011-11-03 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|